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INTRODUCTION-
~e attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on December 7, 1941
drew the United States of America into a war which had previously been
confined to continents of the eastern hemisphere, and in so doing con-
verted a limited war into a global war. Following the course of that
global war, it is easy to forget or overlook the effect of this world
catastrophe upon specific areas of our own country or upon segments of
our o-wn population.
The treatment of the 127,000 ~rsons of Japanese ancestry in the
United States has posed particularly difficult problems for us. War
did not create these problems; it merely threw them into bold relief.
War did not change for most of us our beliefs, attitudes and prejudices
toward these and other peoples; it merely crystallized or intensified
them. We have, in the course of this war, been brought face to face
with the paradox of the ideals ot AmericaJl democracy in conflict with
their practice.
At the same time that war brings to a crisis our relations with
our cultural and ethnic minorities it creates equally great stresses
within the minority group itself. Individuals become intensely sensitive
to the attitudes and treatment to which they are subjected. They are
impelled to examine more closely their sentiments and loyalties am to
resolve their indecisions and conflicts. \!Lth the condition of war
between the United States and Japan, these conflicts within the Japanese
Il American minority became doubly deep because they involved ties of home-
laJld, culture aJld race.
I ~e Japanese AmericaJls, since Pearl Harbor, have been subject to
external and internal pressures and demands for affirmations of their
loyalty or disloyalty, more intense and inclusive than have ever been
exerted on any other minority'. '!he kind, magnitude, and effect of these
pressures form. a chapter in the history of minority peoples t~t is
unparalleled.
The authorities decided that military necessity demanded the re-
~ moval of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. On Feb-
ruary 19, 1942, Executi w Order No. 9066 was issued by President Roosevelt
which authorized the evacuation and exclusion of persons from military
areas designated by the Secretary of War and the military cOImnanders. On
~rch 2, General DeWitt ot the Western Defense COJmDand established Mili-
tary Areas Nos. 1 and 2. Between February 19 and March 2'7, the Japanese
were tree to leave the exclusion area and 10,2.31 left Military Area No.
1. Of this number 4,825 JOOVed into Area No.2 which at that time had not
been scheduled tor evacuation. Those who thus voluntarily evacuated met
with sane ~pleasantness, and it soon became apparent that an uncontrolled
movement would create confusion, hardship, and ~ssibly trouble. The
decision was reached that the evacuation must be regulated. It was
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.decided that centers should be constructed to receive the evacuees, and
that the administration of the centers should be the responsibility of a
civilian agency.
On lrarch 18, the President issued ~cutive Order No. 9102 which
created the War Relocation Authority. This was to be the civilian agency
which received the responsibility for care and administration of the evac-
uees received from the Army. "By tenDS of the Order. the Authority is re-
sponsible for: (1) aiding the Amy in carrying out the evacuation of mili-
tary areas. (2) developin~ and supervising a planned. orderly program of
relocation for evacuees. (3) providing evacuees with work opportunities so
that they my contribute to their own maintenance and to the national pro-
duction program, and (4) protecting evacuees from ham in the areas where
they are relocated. The first ~ecific task of the Authority is to re-
settle some 100.000 alien and American-bom Japanese evacuated from mili-
tary areas of the far western states."l
Location and construction of these centers began immediately with
two each placed in the States of Arkansas. Calif'ornia. and Arizona, and
one each in the States of Utah. Idaho, Wyoming. and Colorado. On ~rch 27
an order _s issued which prohibited all persons of Japanese ancestry from
leaving the designated military areas voluntarily. '!his was followed by
a series of 108 separate orders issued by General DeWitt which ordered the
I-Vii8"ya! of aU Japanese from JW.itary Areas No.1 and No.2. The exclusion
area included aU of Cal1.tornia, the western half of Washington and Oregon,
aI¥i southern Arizona. !lost of the persons of Japanese ancestry were orig-
1naUy transferred to asssnbly centers, and from there \.ere gradually
.funneled to relocation centers as the latter were constructed. By June 5,
the removal had been accomplished for Area No.1. and by August 7, for
Area No.2.
Movement to the relocation centers began in ~y 1942. and by Novem-
ber 1 of that year, the last of the UO,OOO persons of Japanese ancestry
had been placed in the centers. 'ftle evacuation included everyone except
the handf'ul who were in corrective or other institutions.
Evac1Jation was an orderly process. ).{any public and private civilian
agencies cooperated with the Army and with the evacuees in an attempt to
safeguard the interests of these wartime exiles. '!be evacuees themselves
gave full cooperation which prompted the statement from Secretary of 1Var
Stimson that "great credit is due our Japanese population for the mnnerin which they responded to azn canplied with the orders for exclusion. 1.1
The speed with which evacuation was decided upon and carried out, made it
necessary for the evacuees to make hurried arrangements for the sale or
lease of their property. and same liquidated all their possessions. selling
-
lEisenhower policy statement of May 29.
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-houses, businesses, .farms, and .furnittn-e. Where such haste was required
it is obvious that not all these transactions "ere advantageous, and the
meD¥>ry o.f property losses stings deeply.
The relocation centers to which the Japanese were sent were sjm11Ar
in construction am plan. 'r1le buildings 'were frame covered with black tar
paper, arranged in blocks design~ to house from 250 to ~ persons. Each
block contained .fourteen single story barracks, divided into .four or six
apartments, a mess hall, a recreation hall, men's and women's latrines,
and a laundry room. 'r1le number o.f blocks in a cwmp depended on its size.
Manzanar in Cali.fornia, with a peak population of over 10,000 had 36
blocks. Additional construction included a frame hospital and auxiliarybuildings, offices, living quarters for the administrative staf.f~ and .
-utility buildings for warehouses, garages, construction, iMustry and agri-
culture. The school buildings which were built later usually included a
combination gymnasium-auditorium and classrooms for the high school. In
several projects the elementary schools were housed in blocks vacated by
residents.
The administrative responsibility for each center was given to a
non-Japanese civilian staff. These included a project director and his
three assistants in operations, administrative management, and community
mnagemnt, a reports officer and an attorney. 'l11e cormnunity management
division included education, health, recreation, internal security, family
welfare, community ana1~is, and community goverrunent. 'n1e operations
division was responsible for construction, maintenance, roads, utilities,
agriculture, transport and industry. Administrative management provided
the services of procurement, accounting and budgeting, employment, mess
operations and personnel.
'n1e early policy of the War Relocation Authority was based on the
assumption that the relocation centers would be war duration homes for most
of the evacuees, or until military necessity no longer excluded them from
the West Coast. It was the hope that through agriculture and industry
these communities would become nearly self-supporting, and that there
would be a measurable degree of local government.
Based on this assumption, the early policy was directed toward the
creation of self-contained economic and social units. 'n1e economic devel-
o~nt would include the production of agricultural products not only for
internal consum:ption, but also for distribution through regular mrket
channels, and the establishment of factories that would engage entirely
in war production. The necessary social serTices would be provided largely
through recruitment from the evacuees. The hospitals, schools, police,
.fire, maintenance, and other activities would be largely evacuee staffed
and directed.
Recognition of the need for colmnunity goverrunent was demonstrated
as early as April 2 in a manorandum which stated: "It is proposed to devel-
op ilmned1ately a system of internal government which will place upon the
(3)
evacuees re~onsibllity for the civic management of the colony 'and to or-
ganize health, education, recreation and other community service using
Ja~ese personnel as tar as possible. 112
These general objectives and policies were expressed in several
. documents. The May 29 policy statement read: "The objective of the pro-
gram is to provide, for the duration of the war and as nearly as wartime
exLgencies pennit, an equitable substitute for the life, 'WOrk, and homes
given up, and to facilitate participation in the productive life of America
both during and after the war. II Further illumination is provided by an
additional statement which read: "In the last analysis, each relocationcommunity will be approximately what the evacuees choose to make it. The .
standards of living and the quality of community life will depend on their
initiative, resourcefulness, and skill. Initially, the Goyernment will
provide the minimum essentials of living-shelter, medical care, and mess
and sanitary facilities--together with work opportunities for self-support."
Administrative responsibility would extend to 'WOrk projects, economical use
of labor, employment outside the project on a voluntary basis, a healt~
and education program and mintenance of law and order.
This policy also envisaged the establishment of a permanent form of
cOlmm.mity goverrunent preceded by an advisory temporary organization. 'l11e
.functions o.f self-government, :in this early thinking, included the assump-
tion by the evacuee government of responsibility for internal security and
--as soon as the project should have reached a reasonably sell-supporting
basis of operation--the care of dependent children and adults.
In its subsequent history the War Relocation Authority diverged .from
the oo.sic philosophical scheme which was tentatively developed in the ear-
lier thinking and :in the first policy statements. '!he objective of self-
supporting, self-governing communities operating on a sound economic base
was realized :in only a limited sense and within a different policy and
philosophy. A number of factors militated against the successful execution
of the first plans for center operation--and indeed canpelled the diver-
gence. The mjor factor was the early decision to institute an active re-
.location program ,mich would return the evacuated people to life and v.ork
in nomal communities. '!he possibility of operating self-supporting c~-
munities was eliminated by two factors: .first, vested economic groups
were violently opposed to the idea of center-production of food for out-
. side markets and to the establishment of competing industrie s wi thin the
centers; second, 1abo~hungry anployers from. agricu1tural areas saw the
relocation centers as labor pools to be tapped when needed, and, in view
of the manpower mortage, it was necessary to utilize evacuee labor to
conserve crops outside of the relocation projects rather than to utilize
it for broad-scale operations within the projects. '!he limited industrial
program finally decided upon included agricu1tural production for evacuee
.
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use onl7, and a short-lived camouflage net project at three centers.
- tis shift in the direction of th.e program had an adverse effect on
the mension of responsibility in other areas of colllD.unity life to the
evacuees. 'nle only activity in which nearly canplete community responsi-
bility was achieved was in the purchasing and distribution of consumer
goods and services through cooperatively organized and managed business
enterprises. Community government became in actuality an adjunct of
administration. Recreation and cultural activities were partly financed
and almost entirely supervised and regulated by a non-evacuee staff. The
other cOJmnunity se1"V'ices became an adjunct of a managerial hierarchy, with
policy am supervision arising !'rom outside the relocation center conmun-
ity. It is true that mny of the workers were drawn from the conmunity,
but the control rested in what came to be known as the "appointed staff."
'nlis nanagerial-administrative combination was established in practice and
policy early in the history of actual center management and was never re-
laxed during the history ot the Authority.
'nlere was almost complete dependence upon the managerial control
system for food, transportation, employment, housing, clothing, education,
health, ]a.." enforcement, fire protection and maintenance. Policy decisions
were made by the top administrators, implemented by procedures developed
by a staff, and carried into effect by paid employees 'Wt>rldng as an admin-
istrative organization at the centers. These policy decisions were made
on the basis of the larger objectives of the top administrative group and
modified from time to time in response to Congressional or other govern-
mental pressures or to evacuee pressures. Although many decisions were re-
lated to perceived needs, no provision was made on the level of policy de-
.~term1na.tion for the participation and advice ot the evacuees in fonnulating
decisions. 'nle structure which was created to provide tor obtaining evacu-
ee advice and assistance in the execution of policies operated principally
at the project level and there only in a limited and circumscribed manner.
Managerial administration thus provided the preva.1.1ing envirorunent within
which the economic, cultural and political activity ot the evacuees had to
grow. The result, of course, was a rather thorough and efficient institu-
tionalization ot the population.
It has not been the purpose here to examine the whole of the war
Relocation Authority's history and growth, but it has been necessary to
sketch the developmental beginnings in order to pJ.ace the function aId
policy of coJlDnunity govenaent within a meaningful framework.
.
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CHAPTm I
THE EARLY. HIErrOOY OF POLICY [OR COMMUNITY r.o~m.m(ENT -
Concepts of coJmnunity government for relocation centers were broad
and liberal in the period when they were related to a theory of self-
supporting and self-administered COImnunities and when the centers had not
yet materialized. It has been pointed out that certain practical consid-
erations stood in the ~Y of carrying out the plans first devised for the
operation of the centers. It was perhaps inevitable that the concept of
evacuee-administered communities should.give way to the fact of com-
munities administered by civil-service personnel.
Dictating the rather narrow framework in which coJmnunity govem-
ment was actually set up were such factors as the need for establishing
effective controls over the expenditure of Govemment funds, the impor-
tance of maintaining satisfactory relations with Congress, and the general
confusion and disorganization of the evacuee population in the period
when the centers were being occupied.
It has been said repeatedly that there was no pattern, no guidance,
for the War Relocation Authority to follow. Certainly there was no pre-
cedent for establishing center government. There were two American com-
munities operating under Federal jurisdiction-the TVA town of Norris and
Boulder City in Nevada--but these communities offered no parallel to war-
time relocation centers nor did they have comprehensive legal or political
statements of policy to provide guidance to the \iRA.
A. Legal Limitations and the First Policy Statement
Legal considerations were dominating factors, not only to commun-
ity government policy, but in the whole area of action possible to the
Authority itself. The foLlowing paraphrase of a statement made by the
Solicitor of the Authority in San Francisco on April 27, 1942, sets forth
the legal basis upon which policy would be formulated.
"!he LeRal Framework of Project Self-Government
"It is obviously impracticable to use existing state laws
for the creation of local governmental units in the reloca-
tion centers, primarily because if cities were organized
under state laws, the elected officers would have complete
control over city government and would have powers inconsis-
tent with the administration of the project by the Federal
. Government. It is nevertheless possible to set up a pro-
cedure under mich a 'mayor,' a 'city council,' and 'courts'
can be established within the relocation centers with much
the same functions as they would have under the regular city
. (6)
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-form of government. In legal theory the project manager
would merely delegate certain of his administrative functions
to persons designated by election or otherwise by the Japan-
ese. He would retain in that manner such degree of control
or veto power as might be necessary for him to discharge hisresponsibil1.ty." .
During lfay the Solicitor's office was busy on a document entitled
"Regulations Concerning Organization of Self-Government within Assanbly
Centers and Relocation Centers." This was in essence a plan for the or-
ganization of a municipal council, the election of a mayor, and a state-
ment of their functions together with plans for the procedures of govern-
ments, the establishment of a municipal court, the operation of the court
and a list of punishable offenses. It provided for the appointment of an
evacuee chief of police by the mayor and for the organization of a police
depa~ent under the supervision of the chief of police. Although thisdocument was prepared for the signature of the Director, after its review .
by a number of persons in and out of the Authority, it was pronounced over-
elaborate, prejudging the problem and precluding evacuee self-determina-
tion as to the fom their "government" should take. It was never issued.
The earliest official statement on co1Dnunity government was made in
the Director's policy statement. of Yay 29. This statement was elaborated
in the m~rardum of June 5, providing for the election of a temporary
council to advise the project director. It also provided for the selec-
tion of a chairman and other officers and the appointment of an executive
and a judicial coImn1ttee. Voting was extended to everyone 18 years of
age or older, but only citizens of the United States 21 years of age or
over were eligible to hold office.
The decision limiting elective office to citizens provoked much
discussion among both the officials of the Authority and the evacuees.
Since the limitation clause was retained in the later policy statement of
Autust 24, it is useful to examine the official thinking behind this limi-
tation. The position taken by the Solicitor's office and several other
staff members in Washington, was that since the objective of WRA was to
create a community as nearly American in its outlook and organization as
possible, policy should conform with American practice, and only citizens
should vote and hold office. Those concerned with the problem of public
relations and possible criticism of the program maintained that it would
be unwise to establish communities in Which there was a likelihood that
the governing council would be controlled by aliens. They pointed out
that control might pass to those who were not in sympathy with the objec-
tives of the Authority or with the war effort.
It was further pointed out that the evacuation of citizens from the
West Coast was of doubtful constitutionality and had certainly created
grave doubts in the minds of many Nisei as to their rights under the
(7)
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¥Constitution of the United States. Those taking this position argued that
it was desirable to give some added recognition to the citizens beyond
that extended to aliens to indicate to them that the Federal Govemment
was cognizant of their status. It 'E.S thought that a policy which pro-
vided that only citizens were eligible for voting and holding office would
acc~plish this. This point of view was advanced by the representatives
of the Japanese American Citizens League who were at that time in consul-
tation with officials of the War Relocation Authority.
There were, however, some who maintained that there should be no
distinction made between citizens and aliens in participation in se1£-
government. The proponents of this view stated that it would be practi-
cally impossible and certainly undesirable to make any distinction in
the residents of the community if we were to achieve an organized and in-
tegrated society with full participation of its adult members. It was
also pOinted out that the wisdom and experience of the older evacuees,
almost all of whom were aliens, would be denied not only to the project
manager but also to the comm~~ty itself. The precedent cited was of
local elections for school board members and other minor officials Where
it was the practice to permit persons who were aliens to participate as
electors. From these opposing viewpoints came the compromise which pro-
vided that all adults would be eligible to vote, but that only citizens
could hold office.
The period between June 5 and August 24, when a final statement of
policy on communit7 government was signed by the Director, provided an
opportunity for further consideration of the role of community government
and an exandL~tion of the functioning of the recently established tempor-
ary councils at three centers. It was a. period in which interest in self-
govermnent was overshadowed by concern with policies of immediate concern
in the fields of operation, maintenance, and supply.
B. Washington and San Francisco Proposals
In July 1942, there was added to the Washington staff, Dr. Charles
M. Kneier, a recognized consultant on municipal organization. His approach
included the definition of legal limitations, the relation to other policy
consideration, and the application of his extensive knowledge of the
mechanics of the organization and functioning of municipal govemment to
the problem at band. The extent to which the Authority could or 'WOuld
confer power upon an evacuee self-govermnent was basic as he expressed it
in a. memorandum of July 22.
"The degree of power to be conferred upon the evacuees
living in relocation centers is at the heart of the sel.f-
government problem and presents many difficulties. The
advantages of self-government in the centers must I it is
ass\Ded, be balanced with the responsibility of the Author-
ity in their efficient and effective administration. Some
(8)
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r l1m1ts must be p1a.ced upon the power of the centers todetemine policies. In the' actual administration of the .
, centers, it w~d appear to be desirable and necessary to
: limit the degree of self-government. Illustrative of this
field where self-government would not be feasible would be
control over the non-evacuee administrative personnel, pur-
chasing of materials, and type of streets and methods of
construction. n -
Dr. Kneier offered two a.lternative proposals defining the scope of
authority conferred upon a self-governing body. The first provided for
the enactment of regulations and penalties, the settling of disputes,
passing resolutions, and for assessments on residents, "but only for thepurpose of raising revenue for the support. of education, recreation, .
health, and such purposes as will directly proD¥)te the 1981fare of the
residents of the centers." Veto authority for regulations was retained
by the Director and all assessments required the approval of the project
director. The second proposal included all of the powers enumerated in
the first,- but was stated in more general terms.
Consideration was recommended for a plan to provide for partici-
pation of the evacuees in selecting personnel who would be employed to
administer the policies established by the governing body. Excepting
that WRA ~uld Eke the decision for certain positions filled by evacuees,
participation by the Council was suggested in selection of candidates for
the remainder of the positions. This recOJmnendation was to be accom-
plished by the creation o'f a Civil Service Colm1ssion mde up of repre-
sentatives of both staff and evacuees. The commission would classify p0-
sitions or recOJmnend their classification to the council together with an
examination to determine qualifications of applicants. The conlnission
would a.lso certify eligibUity lists to fill Tacant positions, with the
proviso that final plwer remain with the Authority. Dr. Krteier also
recognized the need for a court system, to apply penalties for violation
of Council regulations and to provide mchinery for the adjudication of
civil cases not falling under the jurisdiction of state laws.
A final point, carefully indicated to be used as a basis for dis-
cussion and not as a recanmendation, was to provide machinery by which the
conmunitY' council would work with the project director on the preparation
of an operating budget. Under such provision, if adopted, the council
would hold public hearings and submit written suggestions to the project
director, with the understanding that council action was to be advisoryonly and that final decision rested with the Authority. .
Another expression or thinking on community government policy was
found in a "Supplemental Policy Statement on Project Government" prepared
in the San Francisco office and transmitted to the Washington office on
JulY' 2:>. This statement defined the broad objectives and general princi-
ples which wwre absent from the June 5 po~icy. It was prepared in re-
sponse to the need for ilmnediate clarification of policy a t the centers.
(9)
This need was expressed by project directors who were striving to bring
some order into the confused conditions existing at the centers.
Two paragraphs of this statement are indicative of the continuing movement
for a broad definition of the functions and responsibilities of self-
government, including the measurement of the success of project administra-
tion as a corollary of delegation of responsibility.
- "A camnunity government shall have as its objectives the
training of residents of the community in the democratic
principles of civic participation and responsibility; it
shall assume the responsibility for the regulation of
community life; it shall assume much of the responsibility 
for the formulation of policy and administrative direction 
of services and supply.
"During the initial stages of settlsnent and camtunity
organization, it is recognized that the inexperience of
the colonists and the exigencies of the administrative
situation prohibit any broad delegation of authority.
However, the success of project administration Should
be considered a direct expression of the delegation by
the project director and the assumption by the community
of the responsibilities of self-government."
Action by the Washington office on this recamnendation was de-
I ferred because of the decision to hold a general policy meeting in San
Francisco in early August, at which time policy on community government
would be considered. It was also decided that interested members of the
Washington staff would visit the centers to gain first-hand lmowledge to
aid in policy detemination.
Previous to the August policy conferences in San Francisco a tenta-
tive policy statement offers further illumination of early thinking. It
reco~zed the complete authority of the project director for problems of
project management aM operation, which .included authority to delegate re-
sponsibilities to an evacuee governing body. It set as its objective the
delegation of pcmer to a center government commensurate with that exercised
by an American municipality of approximately the same size. The objective
of calmunity government would be to secure, under democratic methods, ci'Yic
participation and responsibility in cOmm\mity life. It would have an ad-
visorY' responsibility for the formulation of policY' and administrative di-
. rection of serYices and supplies. A permanent group would be preceded bY'
. a temporary council and the preparation of a "constitution" describing the
organization and function of community government.
"The constitution shall contain the procedures for the organization
of a permanent council, the powers and duties of the council, the proce-
dures for the establis1unent of associated administrative and planning
groups; and the powers, duties, am relationships of these associated
groups." '111e only limitations were that it should be democratic in form,
(10)
should not place restrictions on civil liberties vfith the exception of
the prohibition of the publication or distribution of materials in the
Japanese language and of the use of the Japanese language at the dis-
cretion of the project director.
These functions delegated to the council would include the enact-
ment of ordinances together with punisnrnents, assessment of consumer en-
terprises, the expending of monies, the regulation of prope~y and
buildings constructed from community ftmds, regulation of activities of
religious groups, the appointment of a permanent staff for the council
and administrative responsibility upon delegation by the project direc-
tor for block administration, police department, fire department, main~
tenance and repair, streets and parks, courts, legal aid council, pub-
lic welfare, libraries and housing. The council would also act in an
advisory capacity in the preparation-of the annual budget and in the
development of policy and administration in the programs of education,
health, employment, community enterprises, and in other ways as the
project director might indicate. Other portions of this policy state-
ment included plans for the establishment of commissions, boards, and
committees and an over-all civic planning commission with details
governing the establishing of a temporary community councile
C. The Policy Evolved at San Francisco
Policy problems to be considered at the San Francisco conference '
included education, procurement, welfare, furloughs, health, employment,
compensation, consumer enterprises, religion, segregation, food, fiscal,
personnel, internal security, public relations, housing, and others in
addition to commUnity government. Staff members from Washington, San
Francisco and the centers faced knotty questions affecting organization
and procedures. Preliminary discussions revealed widely divergent atti-
tudes toward basic policy. As issues were clarified and decisions made,
the earlier objectives of self-contained and self-supporting communities
became subordinated to the point of view that the relocation centers
were to be primarily temporary havens until it was possible for their
residents to establish themselves in new communities or to return to
their West Coast homes. There were to be created no ~centi ves or
symbols that ~uld deter the outward movement.
It was perhaps inevitable that any hopes that community government
could be a significant and important segment of total policy become an im-
possibility in this newly defined direction of Authority policy. It is
not, therefore, surprising to find that the final policy on community
government was cast in a mould of limitations much greater than had been
anticipated in policy or public statements made earlier. A Solicitor's
opinion issued some two months later summarized official thinking in the,
statement: ". . . the basic legal concept underlying the contemplated
government of relocation centers is that of administrative authority ex-
ercised by responsible officials of the War Relocation Authority aided
and assisted by the evacuees themselves." later, in the same document,
(11)
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.i it was stated:
!
,
"Conmuriity self-government among the evacuees is not being
institued as an end in itself, even though it is rich in
intrinsic vaJ.ues, but is rather a ~ans to the larger end
of effective administration of the whole program of the
War Relocation Authority.- 'nle best'way to achieve dis-
cipline and order in relocation centers -an admittedly
unique and possibly difficult task-what is being
.sought, and the program offered by Administrative Instruc-
tion No. .34 constitutes no Utopian's' dream of an ideal
government, but rather a practical administrator's attempt
to preserve order in a somewhat special type of cormnunity.
~e acts which the Director, by the Instruction, empowers
the CoJmm.1n1ty Council to do, are aJ.l acts which the Direc-
tor, under the controlling Executive Order, is himself
empowered to do."
The policy on camnunity goverrunent was issued August 24 as Ad-
ministrative Instruction No. .34. It provided that the essential points
of the June 5 memorandum for the establishDent of temporary community
councils should continue in operation. It also prO'vided for the estab-
lishment of a pemanent cODlD.unity council. '!his permanent organization
would become effective after the preparation of a plan of government by
, the evacuees Which was then to be approved by a majority of the evacuees.
It stipulated that the plan of government should inclooe provisions for
the election of a cOJIlIlunity council and the organization of a judicial
cOJmn1ssion. nte council would have authority to prescribe regulations and
penalties for offenses of a minor nature. It could pass resolutions, re-
ceive and administer f\mds and property" license business enterprises to
an amount not to exceed 11,000 for any one year" and to exercise such
other duties and responsibilities as might be delegated to it.
'n1e judicial commission .-JaS empowered to hear cases and apply pen-
alties for violation of the regulations of the coIrDnunity council. Felon-'
ies and civil cases except those subject to arbitration were to be handled
by the State or Federal courts. The Project director was given the right
to set aside any regulation of the council which he found to be in excess
of its functions and to remand to the judicial commission for reconsidera-
tion any decision which he felt to be inappropriate. The project director
was also given authority to establish such organization and to promulgate
such regulations as he found necessary pending the organization of a for-
mal coImnunity council under an approved plan of govenwent. The last
paragraph of this policy clearly stated that the fuqctions delegated were
in addition to and not in substitution for the functions and responsibili-
ties of the project director.
Conspicuously absent was the delegation of administrative resonsi-
bilities. Earlier tentative considerations to assign responsibility to
community government for internal security, fire protection, maintenance,
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and otler services and operations were dropped as possibJ.e functions. It
is a matter of history that the Authority never reJ.inquished any of its
marm.gerial responsibilities in these phases of project life.
~e controversial prorlsion that council membership be limited tocitizens remained unchanged although non-citizens were eligible for mem- ~
bership on appointed committees, ccmmissions, boards, and for other admin-
istrative positions. The project directors of Poston and Tule lake had
, expressed satisfaction with the working of the temporary citizen councils.
Furthennore, they held no strong beliefs that the exclusion of aliens
would seriously haJDper the YOrk of conmun1ty government. At l(a.nzanar, there
had been a number of' minor disturbances in which Nisei, Kibei and Issei
had been involved. The decision by the WOC! to limit membership on assem-
bly center councils to citizens was another influence. 'me ~A liaison
of'ficer attending the policy meetings on camnunity v.overnment favored l.im-
iting voting privileges as well as office holding to include only citizens.
'ftle policy on cotmnurdty govemment had one \1n1que distinction. It
was the only 8jor policy issued by the Authority Which was pem:1ssive in
character. 11', for example, the residents of any particular center should
decide either by the rejection of a submitted plan of government or in any
other way that they were not desirous pf' establishing fo~l community
government, there was no direct or implied coercion to force acceptance.
Conversely, it was the only policy which required the assent of' a majority
of the residents before it became operative.
.
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CHAPTER n
PROBLa!S OF COMl(lJNIT! GOVERNLfENT
A. 'I'ie Social Setting
The problem of cormnunity government was the problem of the diver-
gent geographic, economic, social, political, educational, and age groups
that have plagued all attempts of the pe.ople of Japanese ancestry in
America to achieve a true colmnunity of interest. It was the problem ot
a racial cultural minority suddenly catapulted from its fonner adjustnent
by reason of a world situation. It was a problem of the need for creat~on
of new values and social structure to meet the conditions of a new social
and physical environment.
Another difficulty equally insurmountable to the creation of any
sort. of truly representative self-government was the e.xplicit responsibil-
ity of the War Relocation Authority for the administrat.ive direction and
policy making f'unction. As long as policy, and as long as administrative
direction originated largely outside the cOlmmmity, without consultation
with it, or without regard to its-wishes, then self-government (no matter
how enlightened or liberal) must remain a truly limited and mis~d activ-
ity. Actually, canplete autonany in center management was neither feasible
nor contemplated.
'I'is nerr environment into which the evacuees moved was one of unifom-
ity 1n housing, food, employment am available service's. Not so the people.
Their only conmon _sting ground was that they were aU of Japanese ancestry",
they bad all ezperienced evacuation, and they were all subject to the sam
rules and regulations in their present situation. The social and cultural
differences 'Within the population were of more significance than were the
simj'Aritie~. 'I'ie most easily observable difference was that between the
older alien generation of parents, most of whom continued to speak their
native language with fluency and observed the customs of Japanese culture,
and the younger generation of American citizens, almost all of whom used
~sh as their native tongue, and D¥)st of whom were American in thought,
manners, and action.
'ftlere were, however, many differences 'Within each of these two
groups, and these were so fundamental that they sometimes led to conflict,
and often to misunderstanding. Among the Issei were rich and poor, farmerB
and city folk, shopkeepers, professional men, and laborers. Some had been
highly educated in this country or in Japan, some had little schooling.
'Dlere were some WlO spoke good Fliglish, mny who spoke only Japanese.
There were even a few who spoke a non-Japanese native dialect. There were
those who openly condemned the military machine of Japan, those who lament-
ed that these two countries should be at war, and those who were ~pa-
thetic to JaJ:an.
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,'nle American born were divided into two najor groups. Those 'Who
had been educated in this country, with the eJtCeption of a few whomme
from isolated rural areas, were predominantly American in outlook and be-
havior. These were the Nisei. The Kibei were those who although born in
this country bad received a considerable portion of their education in
Japan, and had subsequently returned to this country to rejoin their fam-
ilies or to secure additional education, for employment, to evade military
service in Japan, or for a combination of these reasons.
The Kibei were of especial interest because by and large they were
predominantly Japanese in culture and outlook. Careful examination re-
vealed, however, that this group also exhibited significant d1 vergencies.
There ,,,,as no hard and fast correlation between political loyalty, cultural .
identification, or economic attainment. Politically, they ranged from the
few who had assimilated the jingoism of Japanese militarism, to those who
were equally vehement in their opposition. The great D18jority fell some-
where between.-
The Kibei created a particularly difficult problem in the centers.
Many of them had no parents in this country. Because they frequently spoke
fluent Japanese and little English, and observed Japanese customs they had
little in common with their age-mates, the Nisei. Conflict and mutual
avoidance between these two groups were widespread before evacuation. The
Kibei were neither wholly Japanese nor wholly American in culture. This
cultural ambivalence was an advantage among some of the older and wiser
Kibei who were able to bridge the gap between Issei and Nisei, and to re-
solve and reconcile some of the conflicts.
The Nisei were also divided, and their iJIIn6turity militated against .
their possessing the confidence of their elders or of others. Although
there were 71,900 American-bom evacuated, only 22,400 were over 21 years
of age, and these constituted only one-third of the adult Japanese popu-
lation. The Japanese American Citizens League claimed as members many of
the Nisei, although there was a group of young intellectuals which was not
sympathetic with its program.
In addition to the problems which steJlUned irectly from evacuation,
there were also those problems for which the Japanese in America had the~
selves been unable to find answers. It would have been difficult to ad-
minister a relocation center even without the questions of constitution-
ality of evacuation, citizenship rights, public antagonism and many other
complicated factors. Many of these questions could not be answered. Never-
theless, they constantly influenced the behavior of the evacuees and the
administration.
A report was nade in late 1942 on the situation existillg at one of
the centers portrayed some of the crucial problems of this early period.
lM=orandtDD. to E. R. Fryer from S.' T. Kimball
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"An iIIII18diate problem is tJ]at of the conflict between
alien Japanese and those who have American citizenship.
Relocation (evacuation) has emphasized the conflicting
values held by these two groups and the policy which gives
control of camnunity government to the citizens is a cause
for dissatisfaction and non-participation on the part of
some aliens.
"The uncertainties concerning the future expressed by fre-
quent rumors ranging all the way from removal to other
relocation centers to repatriation to Japan hinders the
creation of a feeling of security and stability and frus-
trates the incentives for creating a productive and satis-
factory commuriity. Many of the more intelligent citizens
react to this comition by a desire to leave relocation
centers. There are some, especially among the Issei who
are willing to wait quietly until the outcome of the mr
has been ~cided. If Japan wins they are certain that the 
future is bright; if Japan loses they will passively accept
what fate holds in store for them. ,
"An additional uncertainty is found in the relationship be-
tween the project administrative staff and the evacuees.
There has been misinterpretation on the part of some that
self-government would eventually mean the complete control
of administration by the evacuees. Others believe self-
government to be meaningless.
"'nle failure or inability of fomerly responsible persons
to assume an active leadership further complicates admin-
istration. The attempts of the' Jo. A. C. L. to claim lead-
ership of the evacuees has been almst universally repudi-
ated. This repudiation is based on the belief that the
J. A. C. L. leaders were in large measure responsible for
the decision to evacuate and that they sacrificed members
of their national group for their own selfish interest.
This distrust of the J. A. C. L. is held not only by the
alien group but also by a large contingent of citizens
although for a different reason. The citizens f group
feels that it has received ineffective leadership with the
failm-e of this body to take a strong position previous to
the war against the Fascist countries.
"The alien leaders have failed to take an active part be-
cause of the policy of the F. B. I. in detaining the many
Issei leaders. They feel that to assume a position of
leadership within the project would result in scrutiny
and probable arrest and removal by Federal agencies. In
some instances they have failed to take a position of
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leadership because of the reliance of administrative per-
sonnel on the younger and more aggressive evacuees. By
and large the informal Issei leadership that has developed
at 'l'ule lake has come from persons who are not respected
by other members of the community either previous to their
evacuation or since. Issei and Nisei who have expressed
themselves are in agreement that the so-called agitators
and those responsible for an~i~nistrative difficulties have
come fran this group.
"An additional problem facing the administration is that
of the difficulty of creating a nonnal community when many
external aspects resemble a concentration camp. The pres-
ence of troops, guard towers, restrictions on tree move-
ment and the impOsition of rules and regulations without
consultation are all evidences of the fact that evacuees
are not tree persons.
itA furt.her problem is the need for the occupation of time
and interest of all evacuees. Primarily, there is the
need for the development of an employment policy which
will absorb large groups of persons and give purposeful
and productive work relationships. This is necessary it
satisfactory conlllunity life is to be achieved. If achieved,
the result may conflict with the desire to reloca~e.
"The problem of conununica tion is a serious one. It is com-
plicated by the fact that mny evacuees do not speak or
understand ~glish. It is hampered by the inability of
the channels of communication which have been established
to either fully inform the residents of policy and the rea-
sons or for the evacuees to communicate to the administra-
tion their wishes and desires.
"Specifically, there is as yet no real understanding of the
complicated process by ~ich the administration is able to
secure foodstuffs, clothing, building materials and so forth
which are needed for the health and comfort of the residents.
lacking such understanding, it is also impossible to appre-
ciate the difficulties Which the administration faces in
securing these things or to understand why it is impossible
to secure many things Which are essential. Whether we like
it or not the procedures which we follow to secure food,
clothing and other essentials are institutional procedures
and verge toward ~ternalism. The inability of people to
have any say in what they do or do not receive and thus in
the final analysis to be helpless to control whether they
do or do not get what they need must inevitably create
insecurity."
(17)
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B. Disorganization and the Beginning of Organization
Broadly defined, camnunity government was inclusive of more than
the community council and its associated bodies. It also included
block councils and block managers. The block managers as an organized
group and with syst~tic COlmnun1cation with the administration and the
residents was a significant administrative and political factor in
community life. It was much later in center history that a more defi-
nite separation of managerial and represAntati ve functions was achieYed.
The first organized evacuee group, the block managers, was
admirdstratively sponsored and supervised. The block manager system
included an appointed evacuee for each residential block, a coordinator
and his staff, all under the supervision of a non-evacuee ci vil-serrlce
appointee. It was the block manager's responsibility to distribute
supplies and materials, to maintain records, to conduct censuses, and .
to perform a myriad of other tasks which had direct relation to the
welfare and comfort of the residents of his block. He filled an
adminjstrative need for an 1Dmediate channel of cODln\m1cation with the
residents and for the control of distribution of supplies to the
residents of the block. An equally important function was his ability
to report to the administration the needs, problems, and attitudes of
the residents of his block and to interpret and make suggestions for
meeting problems of a block or cOlmnunity nature. Thus it was that the
block manager, as an individual and as a member of a group, was in a
strategic position in administration-evacuee relations, and filled an
iDlnediate and important function in the total plan of project
management.
Too much credit cannot be given to the conscientious efforts of
the block manager to work for the welfare of the residents. Especially
in the early period of contusion, his was a twenty-four hoUr job. If a
resident became ill in the middle of the night, it was the block manager
who was most frequently called to get help. He was often called in as
arbitrator for disputes. Organized cooperative efforts to improve block
or camnunity conditions often came from his initiative.
If the managerial and liaison functions of the block managers
were invaluable to the residents as an administrative device they .re
basic to admini stration. The advice and assistance of this group was
frequently sought and in the early period constituted the only major
contact between the administration and the residents. The fact that the
block managers frequently found themselves considering probl.s which
were political in nature was not disturbing to the administration unless
those probleus were controversial and of a kind the administration
wished to avoid at the moment. ~ the other hand, the anmini stration
frequently introduced problems of a cOJllD.un1ty or administrative nature 
at block manager meetings for the purpose of securing advice. 
:
(18)
The block manager system was significant not only as an adminis-
trative device, but also in relation to the development of cOImnunity
government. It was of great importance in quickly developing block
cohesion. It also contributed to the early development of block
loyalties as opposed to community loyalties and to a response to prob-
lems based on block needs as distinct from community needs. As an
e:mmple, the block managers at Poston were concerned, as they were at
several other centers, with the inadequate health facilities which the
earliest evacuees found. This concern was transmitted to the adminis-
tration, but it was not until the temporary community council was
organized that there was a concerted effort to investigate conditions
and to make specific recOJlmendations to the administration.
At most projects, by the time that efforts were directed toward
establishing either a temporary or pemanent comnunity government, the
block managers were well organized with clearly defined responsibili-
ties and functions, and stood in high favor with both evacuees andadministration. It - is not surprising that when discussion on establish-
ing a poUtical body to be }mown as the cODmunity council was initiated,
many people favored the status quo. It is also not surprising that the
block managers, in some instances, expressed opposition to the formation
of a group which conceivably threatened the prestige and status which
the block managers enjoyed. Many of the an_mjn1strative personnel ex-
pressed similar opinions and were quite wUling to continue with an
, organization which was responsive to their needs and at the same time
- not unduly critical of existing conditions.
C. Block Organization
A second development of considerable importance affecting the
future of community government were block organizations frequently
- called block councils. These existed at all centers in one form or
another. The basis of organization, the function, and the history has
varied widely from block to block and from center to center. Gila
River was the only project where the formation of the block council was
encouraged by the administration as the first and most important step
in community organization. There, the project director ~r his repre-
sentative appeared at a mass meeting of each newly occupied block, and,
in addition to discussing general policies and problems, outlined a plan
tor block organization. The plan as conceived at Gila River included a
block council to be composed of one representative elected by the
residents of each barrack, the block manager and the head chef. This
group, to be known as the block council, was to elect its own officers
and work tor the welfare and happiness of the residents ~ This included,
"improvement of the grounds of the block, recreation for the residents
of the block, health, and sanitation for the block, the need of prevent-ing tire hazards, the adjustment of problems that arise among the 
residents of the block."
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The minutes of a meeting held in Canal Campat Gila River in
August 1942 indicate that 15 blocks had organized their block councils
and that the ~nimous response of the block managersto a question
concerning the usefulness of block councils was that they were helpful.
The block councils at Gila River continued to function in Canal CaDnun-
ity throughout the lli'e of the project. Their relative importance
lessened at all centers as problsns of an individual or camnunity-wide
character entered the picture. Nevertheless, there always remained in
most blocks a nuclear organization which met to discuss and decide upon
a course of action whenever a crisis threatened the equillbrium or
stability of the block. 'nlis organization wasmuchutilized bJr the
councils to determine or influence cOJllnunity opinion.
The block council was another of the significant and important
groups which contributed to the stability of project life and brought
individuals into meaningful relations with each other, thus helping to
achieve a group approach to the solution of conm\mity problems. Block
councils were never fully utilized by the project administrations. In
fact, one center officially discouraged any type of organization within
the blocks. This failure to understand and to utilize the block council
as a significant group to which problems and policies might be presented
was to someextent canpensated for by the administrative plan of block
managersand by a system ot political representation based on the block
group. Policies and procedures adequately coDlllunicated either to the
block managersor to the cODlD.unitycouncil would in a properly organ-
ized system be readily transmitted to all block residents. This
terminal transmission was not a parti.cular concern of the administration
and was well or badly organized depending upon the leadership quali-
fications ot either the block manageror block representative.
]n community-wide crises, such as developed in connection with
registration, segregation, selective service and labor difficulties, the
block \mit was frequently the source of original decision. During the
registration crisis manyof the decisions reached in block meetings
represented agreement for a COnDnoncourse of action. There appeared
the obvious contradiction betweena registration form designed to
record each individual's declaration of intentions and loyalty and
answers which actually reflected group decisions. There is the case of
the old manwho appealed a negative answer to the "law-abiding alien"
question on the gro1mds that his block managerhad inaccurately recorded
his affirmative answer. His argument, in brief, was that he had been a
memberof the group in the block which decidAd that all should answ-er
I'yes," and obviously he would not have gone against the group decision
in the registration. The attempt of the Issei Planning Eoard at Me
Lake to overcamewidespread resistance to registering failed because it
. was counter to the more powerful force of block group pressure. This
organization prepared a statement (which was rejected by the project
director) advising against group decision and emphasizing that
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registration was a matter of individual judgJJj.ent. .
This general outline of the organization and function of the
block managers and of block councils and the function of the block as a
group of original decision, will help us to understand the organization
and function of community councils through their period of establish-
ment and growth.
D. The Early History of COIJmlunity Government
Camnunity government began its center history in mid-:May 1942
at the Colorado River Relocation Center. Representatives of the first
four blocks occupied by incoming evacuees met in a messhall to discuss
organization plans for preparing a permanent fom of coumunity govem-
ment. The original meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of pioneers
who were looldng forward to creating a governing body for a peaceful
and productive CODmlunity. The nuclear group under the chairmanship of
the Reverend Mitani, a Christian minister, established a civic plann:ing
commission. Subsequently, a legal bureau staffed by evacuee lawyers
I provided technical assistance. As new blocks were occupied, members of
the planning commission met with residents explaining the objectives
and purposes of the group and securing the election of additional
representatives.
This initial attempt at community government was abortive,
although the plan that was developed was to be utilized during the
November strike. The receipt of the June 5 memorandum in the middle of
that month brought to a halt the efforts of this group. SUbsequently,
a temporary community council, elected and inducted into office in July
became the first representative body for Poston.
In the confusion of continuing construction and the reception of
additional hundreds of evacuees, project directors encouraged the
beginnings of the political institution of community government as best
they could. The project director at TUle Lake met with each new
incoming group to explain the policies of the project including the
election of representatives to a community council. By July an organ-
ized group was meeting regularly. The history at Gila River was s1mUar.
There, the project director met with the new residents, block by block.
He encouraged the formation of block councils. When the first unit was
cQmpletely occupied in July, plans were made for the election of repre-
sentatives to a coDmunity council. ~e of the first petitions prepared
by an evacuee group was presented to the project director at Gila River
in August 1942. These resolutions requested among other things, street
lighting, cQmpletion of the water system so that the grounds could be
watered, tables and chairs for apartments and the screening of windows
and laundry rOOOlS. They requested the establishment of a canteen which
would be owned and financed by the evacuees and operated on a non-profit
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. basis. They requested clothing and wearing apparel and laundry soap for
those in dire need. They also requested that there be established a
recreation program, that there be opportunity for the education of
their children, and that provision be made for religious observances ."
and gatherings. They requested completion of hospital facilities and 
that non-citizens be given the privilege to hold elec~ive positions in
the conmunity government.
It is incorrect to assume that the residents were either entirely
in favor of or vitally interested in the establishment of local govern-
ment. The exclusion of Issei from office engendered some opposition.
The vast majority of residents, however, remained disinterested spec-
tators. 'n1e group mst actively interested was composed of a number of
the more mature and politically-minded Nisei including many JACL mem-
bers and some of the better educated and more Americanized Issei.
Opposition, as it developed, came largely from the Kibei, plus some
others who because of resentment, bitterness or loyalties to Japan were
opposed to any action ~ich might be ,construed as cooperation with the
Government of the United States.
There was a third group which took the position that, since the
delegation of authority was so limited, self-government was an impossi-
bility, and therefore it would be wiser to let the Government assume
the full burden of center operation and management. These differences
all found expression in the attempts to formulate a permnent plan of
." conmunity government. 
E. Temporary Corzmunity Councils
The early problems of center ~gement were largely beyond the
effective responsibility of a politically organized evacuee group. The
responsibility for providing food, preserving law and order, establish-
ing fire protection, P1n-chasing equipment, construction, maintenance of
public facilities, recruitment of staff, employment and manifold other
major and minor details of providing goods and services to a newly
established comunity were assumed by the project director and his
staff. Decisions were made without. consultation with the evac'uees.
The problems were many, and there was no organized evacuee group except
the block managers which could be of any assistance. Even the block
managers were able to do no more than to call attention to dire need
and to explain inadequacies to the residents.
The problem was not one of assuming joint responsibility with the
evacuees in project management, but one of conm\mication of the diffi-
culties facing the administrative staff on the one hand and of meeting
the more pressing needs of the residents on the other. This function
was generally assumed by the block managers. The frequently recurring
inability of the administration to secure fuel, lumber, machinery,
,
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sometimes even food, produced many complaints and contributed to the
feeling of insecurity. Pressures placed on the block managers and
subsequently on the administration all too often could not be relieved.
There did develop among many evacuees an appreciation of the sincere
effort s 0 f the administration. There were, however, several areas of
project life Where incompetent personnel, inefficient management, and
bad organization were obvious to the evacuees. If -for example, babies
died in the hospital, not only the families affected, but also the.
entire conmtmity became disturbed and demanded a remedY' for the con-
ditions which permitted the situation. When people were cold from
lack of fuel or equipment for heating, there was a tendency to reject
a'Xplanations of delayed shi}:.nent and to accuse the administration of
inefficiency or in some instances of deliberate intent to contribute to
the discomfort of the evacuees.
It was in this atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty that
tElnPOrary councils were created. To their credit there was no diffi-
culty so great that they were unwilling to tackle it. Council officers
and committees conferred with project directors and staff members.
They m9.de investigations which included interrogation of administrative
staff members. Resolutions were passed calling attention to the con-
ditions, solutions were offered, but in most instances correction of
the situation was beyond the imned1ate control of anyone person and
the efforts of the temporary councils were often regarded by the resi-
dents as unproductive and by the administrative staff as meddling.
this activity, including criticism of the administration on the
part of temporary councils was in part an attempt to determine the
responsibilities, the authority, and the limitations under which co~
cils could operate. Their investigations inevitably led to questioning
of either the administrative or technical ability of the members of the
appointed staff with the result that sane of the latter became irritated
and resistant not only to investigations, but also to proposed solutions.
The administrative staff-, including the project director, was
equally uncertain of the separation of council and administrative
responsibilities. The tendency was to look to administrative action
rather than carmunity pari.icipation to bring solutions. A few project
directors did attempt to explain conditions and secure understanding of
the handicaps under which the administration was operating. Most did
not.
That there were numerous labor difficulties is not surprising.
These sometimes came to the attention of the council, but more often
were negotiated directly by the project director or one of his staff.
The inability of the council to secure acceptance of its views fre-
quently led to the conclusion that the councils were either ineffective
or obstructionist or both. There were examples, such as the attempt ot
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an OWI unit to secure broadcast material at Tule lake where the council
although first giving its approval was later forced to retract its
stand because of COImnunity pressure. Another instance in the same
center involved the use of conmunity funds to construct a building for
showing motion pictures. The proposal favored by the council was
rejected by a referendum of the residents. Council action was not
always attended by failure. There were instances in which its recom-
mendations were followed with benefit to both the residents and the
admin'cstration. These successes, however, were usually not so well
. publicized as 'Were the failures.
At some centers, there were groups of both evacuees and adminis-
trative staff who were disappointed at the fa:Uure of the councils to .
take an aggressive stand on some of the larger issues. Instead,
councils concerned themselves with the immediate problems and pressures
and in so doing were politically realistic. They were well aware that
many issues were extremely controversial and that action on the part
of the council would have led to internal strife and factionalism.
When the council cooperated with the administration, it was suspected
by the residents; when it opposed the administration, it was attacked
as being obstructionist-and in some instances individual members were
accused ot being subversive and disloyal.
It was not surprising that the majority of the residents who
were interested-and that number was not great-considered the council
less effective than the block managers, lacked confidence in its
judgment-or in its ability to negotiate with the administration-and .
resented control by the Nisei and exclusion of the Issei. Neither was
it surprising that many administrators felt that the council was at ,
best a useless and innocuous group, and at worst a trouble~g and
critical group. It was surprising that councils were able to survive
at all. Their survival was due to the confidence and efforts of a few
members of the appointed staff and of those members of the evacuee
conmunity who saw in COImnunity government potentialities that could i
compensate for its early weaJmess of performance.
. F. 'nle Organization COnIn1ssion
The procedures for establishing an organization cOlllnission were
left. to the discretion of the project director. Several methods 1rere
followed. At JOOst centers the temporary cODmUnity council appointed a
commission. At Manzanar and Gila River the project director selected
the members. Minidoka followed the plan of electing two delegates from
each block to a nominating convention which in turn elected a seven-man
group.
rule Lake was the first center to establish a commission--it was
appointed by the conmunity council-and the first to complete and secure
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-ratification of a permanent plan of cCXlmunity organization by the
residents. Central Utah, in December of the same year, completed its
plan and secured ratification. During the first six months of 1943,
charters were approved by Granada and Poston and rejected at Minidoka.
During the last half of 1943, Gila River, Heart Mountain, RDaRr and
Jerome joined the others, and the J.I1nidoka .charter was resubmitted and
accepted. Kanzanar ~emained the only center with no organized torm ot
representative conmunity government which was based on WRA adndnis-
trative suggestion; instead, at this center, a town hall of block
delegates served in an advisory capacity to the project director.
The essentials of both or~nization and function of colDD.unity
government were provided for in the policy statement. Each charter made
provision for the election of a community council with the authority to
enact regulations and to provide penalties. Provision was also made
for the establishment of a judicial commission, the organization of the
council, the election of officers and the appointment of committees and
commissions. The arbitration commission was universally functionless.
There were some variations to meet local conditions. For axample,
at Poston, which _s CaDposed of three distinct communities, the
charter provided for the election of local councils tor each of the
three units of that center. Each local council then elected repre-
sentatives to an over-all coJmnunity council. The over-all council was
responsible for enactment of regulations for the entire center and tor
general policies and problems affecting all the residents. Variation
in council organization appeared also at Minidoka and Gila River. Atthe latter project, each of the two separate camps approved almost -
identical plans of government, but no provision _s made tor thecoordination of the two. This lack was overcome by the creation of an .
executive board composed of members drawn from each council. The
Minidoka council was unique in that it provided for the election at
large of seven members from a list of candidates nominated by delegates
elected from the separate blocks. It also provided for the election of
a block commissioner from each block. Council organization included
an executive committee of 7 members and a consulting and advisory group
of 35. Several of the projects attempted to overcome the unwieldiness
of a large council composed of one representative from each block by the
election of an executive conmittee from within the council group. This
plan worked with indifferent success.
(25)
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UNCERTAINTIES AND CONFUSIONS
A. Evacuee Reaction to Community Government Policy
The reaction of the evacuees to the announcement of policy for the
establishment of a permanent plan of self-government was varied. Ex-
pressions of disappointment at the negligible delegation of responsibil-
ity followed realization that they were to be given only a minor role in
managing their own affairs. Some took the position that the evacuees
should force the WRA to asS1Jme full responsibility and to offer no coop-
eration. Others believed that the policy was better than nothing, but
the vast majority indicated little interest either one way or the other.
The most controversial point and one which provoked most dis-
cussion was the exclusion of Issei from elective office. This policy was
protested and requests for revision were made at several center~. A
group at Gila River submitted a resolution on September 18, 1942. The
resolution stressed the right of non-citizens to hold elective office.
It supported this view with statements to the effect that no better evi-
dence of the sincere desire of the non-citizens to cooperate with the \~r
Relocation Authority could be found than their desire to be treated equal-
ly in the matter of coJmnUnity government. 'n1e resolution pointed out
that there was a "strong unity of purpose between the citizens and non-
.citizens in all matters which are of vital concern to the people of this
- community. . . In view of this situation, to permit the citizens alone to
hold elective positions would undermine seriously the harmony which so
. happily exists between the citizens and non-citizens."
It was contended further that there should be an equal sharing of
responsibility by both groups, and that this could be achieved only by
equal representation. They argued that the present arrangement placed an
undue burden upon the citizens alone. The petitioners declared that many
of the non-citizens were that in name only because of legal prohibitions
to' their assuming citizenship. They pointed out that "they have also
assimilated many of the finer American ideals; they worked continuously
in America ever since coming to this country; they brought up their chil-
dren to be loyal American citizens, many of whom now serve in the Armed
Forces of the Nation; they also bought property and invested heavily in
United States war Bonds with the intention of permanently making this
country their home." The last point was that the non-citizens were the
economic leaders with long years of experience in the operation of exten-
sive areas in the State of California; that these skilled and e~erienced
agricultural leaders should be given a voice in the administration of
self-government and Ulrough such participation contribute to the well-
being of the people of the center and the war effort of the United States.
(26)
The Director answered this resolution October 6, 1942 with an ex-
planation of the reasons for the policy and stated that reconsideration
was impossible. The letter pointed out that:
"In the first place, - believe that the citizenship stat-
us and privilege of the evacuees who were born in the
United states needs to be given ~ecial recognition. The
fact that, as a matter of military necessity, all persons
of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the West Coast,
r both aliens and citizens alike, has caused some of the citi-
zen evacuees to wonder what value their citizenship has.
~ We regret that fact very much. i7e understand, also, that
a few among the alien evacuees have been taunting the .
young Niseis with this fact, and have stated that the citi-
zenship of the Niseis was valueless.
"It is our intention, therefore, to help make up for this
fact, as much as possible, by giving special recognition
to the citizenship status of the Niseis.
[ "In addition to mking elective offices open only to evac-
uees Who are citizens of the United States, it is our in-
tention to give them preference in considering application
for leave from relocation centers, in assignment of work
opportunities, and in other respects.
"A second consideration had a great deal to do with our de-
cision. In general, the Niseis are much more Americanized
than are the Isseis. . . We are of the opinion that if the
Niseis alone are eligible for membership in the community
council, the general Character of the actiqn taken by the
conmunity council will be more in keeping with American
institutions and practices."
The reply also pointed out that Issei were not barred from parti-
cipation in conmlUnity goverrunent but were eligible to hold appointive po-
sitions, thus the wisdom and experience of the alien evacuees would be
utilized. It concluded by affirming that the original decision was a sound
one and should be adhered to.
Copies of the resolution and reply were sent to all centers. No
more petitions came to Vlashington, but project starfs remained aware of
the difficulties which faced organization commissions in their efforts to
give suitable status to the Issei and sufficient opportunity for Issei
participation in community affairs. Policy or no policy, the evacuees
were detemined to include the Issei in a representative system. ~e
first such effort was at Poston where soon after the election of a citi-
zen t~rary council, arrangements were made for the election of an Issei
(27)
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advisory board. There thus arose a dual system of representation with
one Issei and one Nisei from each block, organized in groups meeting
separately, but in close commUnication with each other.
Tule Lake moved toward a oolution of this problem in a different
manner. There, the temporary coJmnUnity council authorized the estab-
lishment of an Issei planning board. Although the planning board had
no legislative function, it worked in close cooperation with the com-
munity council and the two bodies presented community problems to the
project director jointly.
The organization commissions at Heart Mountain and Granada
. attempted to establish a two-house representative system, the upper
house to be composed of Issei, who should serve as advisers to the
lower house, 'Itlich would be canposed of Nisei. This plan as developed
by the evacuees in consultation with project officials was disapproved
by '8K>rd .from Washington that such a plan would be contrary to the in-
tent of the community government policy.
Granada then solved the problem by a mass resignation of Nisei
block managers on the understanding that the administration would
appoint Issei to these positions. The community council bec'ame known as
the Nisei council, a distinction Which stuck with it for a long period.
Even after the removal of the bar to Issei membership, several elections
passed before an appreciable number of Issei were willing to stand for
election.
Gila River attempted to meet the same problem by formalizing a
grour> CompO8ed of chairmen of the block councils, all of whom were
Issei. Rohwer and Jerome solved the problem through an advisory Issei
group and by establishing close working relations with the block man-
agers, who were ~st entirely non-citizens. Central Utah had a
somewhat similar arrangement.
Although the exclusion of Issei from elective office aroused the
greatest controversy, there were other and more fundamental questions
which those engaged in drafting plans of government had to face. These
included legal, political, and ethical considerations affecting the pur-
pose and functioning of an evacuee self-government. From the charter
commission of Heart Mountain came a statement objectifying and dis-
cussing some of these problems.
The commission considered four fundamental questions. The first
was, "Is this real self-government, or is it only so-called self-govern-
ment?" The opinion expressed was "If it is going to be real self-govem-
ment, then it is O. K. It it is going to be a self-government in name
only, then, we do not want it."
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This attitude was held most strongly. The commission then asked
the question, "Why is it that the members agreed to support a document
which they know is not really self-government?" The answer given was:
"Firstly, within a relocation center where freedom of the residents is
restricted, is it possible to ask for complete self-government?Secondly, perchance that such complete self-government is granted, is .,
it advisable for the evacuees to fully exercise such right? Thirdly,
the consideration that the Heart Mountain community consists of both
the American citizen of Japanese ancestry and the alien Japanese had to
be taken into account."
The statement continued, "After thorough discussion, the com-
mission came to the conclusion that it is not only impossible to ask
for complete self-government, but it is better not to ask for it. In
other words, we concluded that it is far better for the evacuees to
leave the final responsibility of the center management to the WRA
staff, while specifying in written documents evacuees' right to have
limited voice in the management. If this plan is adopted, neither the
citizen nor the non-citizen residents need to fear about jeopardizing
their rights."
The next. question asked was, "Vt1'ly not stick to status quo?" The
Issei members who were objecting to the discrimination favored the
status quo-by which they meant a simple system of block managers.
This objection was resolved, however, with the issuance of an amendment
to the instruction permitting Issei equal rights.
The final question asked was, "What are the advantages of adopt-
ing a charter?" The advantages ~re seen as a fonnalization of experi-
ences gained during the preceding several months, which upon being
reduced to a formal code gave greater assurance of the continuation of
the status quo. An additional advantage was that provision was made
for an orderly election of representatives and enactment of regulations
and the guarantee of a voice in the management of a center-even though
that voice was muted. The preamble of the charter expressed these
basic considerations.
B. The First Crises
In the latter part of 1942, major disturbances occurred at two
centers. In late November, a general strike was called in Unit I ofthe Colorado River Relocation Center. Two weeks later, a series of
incidents at Manzanar culminated in a riot and forced the project
director to call in the military police. The great difference in the
fian1 results of these two disturbances, however, was that at Manzanar
the administration emerged as the dominating and controlling factor in
community life, while at Poston, there emerged a stong and responsible
community organization.
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1. The Poston Strike
Although the Poston strike was precipitated by the arrest and
confinement of two evacuees in the project jail, it has been well
established that the causes were rooted in evacuation, assembly center
experience, and conditions at the center. The canbination of heat,
dust, primitive facilities, alleged broken promises, misunderstandings,
am factional conflict were all contributing factors to a general con-
dition of unrest. News of the arrest of the two men created wide
excitement. Rumors spread rapidly and demands grew that the two men
should be released. The calmunity council held several meetings with
project officials and presented the community view with the proposal
for release of the individuals in question and their trial within the
project. They were supported in this position by the Issei advisory
board. The project director was absent; the acting director found it
impossible to accede to these demands, and the council and advi8o~
board resigned.
The situation developed rapidly with an almost complete break-
dmm of conmunication between the administration and the residents.
There was quickly established in the center a committee of 72, c~osed
of one Issei aDd one Nisei representative from each block. This group
aided by the revived city pl~~l\g board decided on a general strike to
secure recognition of community demands. Yost workers willingly com-
plied with the strike decision, and pressure was applied to the
recalcitrants.
The full details of the Poston strike and its many ramifications 
have been adequately documented and reported e~ere.l Our interest 
arises fran the unbelievably rapid strides in cODmunity organization
achieved by a well-organized, adequately led evacuee organization which
remained in control during the course of camnunity government. There
emerged ~ the strike a central executive committee selected by the
eDcutive council of the city p'1anning board and canposed of four Issei 
and four Nisei. There emerged also an agreement on the method of 
electing block managers--previously a controversial point. It was 
agreed to establish an honor court-though ~he court never materia.lized-
and a labor relations board which was to be an adjunct of the central
executive committee. The attempt to make the city planning board the
responsible representative group was not acceptable to the adminis-
tration, which took the position that the community council was the only
official body that would be recognized by the administration. This
pronounc~nt was accepted by the residents, and in Dec~ber a new
temporary community- council and a new Issei advisory board were elected.
ISM A. Leighton - The Goveming of Men
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In the meantime, the attempt made by some of the more radical and
disgruntled leaders to OTerthrow the central executive caunittee was
thwarted, and the pattern of organization which persisted to the end of
the project with only minor modification was firmly established.
The Poston strike produced a system of community representation
and organization acceptable to residents and administration. It also
served to crystallize and resolve many of the previous conflicts and to
give a cohesion which permitted the application of concerted effort to
cOIXlnunity problems. It forced the administration to review- mt only
~~: its own policies, but its relations with the evacuees and produced a
unity of purpose within the administrative staft which had previously
been lacking. It is of some interest that the plans Which were devel-
oped in late May and early June by the evacuee civic planning board and
shelved because of the June 5 memorandum, were the basis of the strike
orgC!!nization and of the pattern of COn1Jlunity government subsequently
adopted.
2. The).(anzanar Riot
The resolution of the diverging interests between Issei, Nisei,
and Kibei was never achieved at Manzanar, where conflict focused on the
policy of coJIlnunity government. This center, which had at first been
under the administration of the waCA, had established a system of semi-
appointed, semi-elected block leaders with no distinction based on
nationality. After the ass\:Bnption of WRA administrative responsibility
in June, no attempt was made to observe the provisions of the June 5
memorandum. The block leaders continued as a representative adminis-
trative group. The administration believed that no distinction should
be made between citizens and non-citizens and wished to continue the
cooperative relations which msted between the admjJlistration and the
block leaders. The announcement of the new policy of community govern-
ment as made by the project director in late August was to the effect
that the block leaders would be disbanded and in its place there would
be established a.Nisei community council. This threat to the vested
position of the block leaders was not readily accepted and even later,
when it was explained that their activities would continue much as in
the past, the harm of the original announcement was never completely
dispelled either a1JX>ng the block leaders or among the community from
,1, which the block leaders drew support.
,
It was also at )lanzanar that the conflict between openly loyal
Japanese Americans on the one hand and Kibei and aliens with pro-
Japanese leanings on the other broke into the open in dramatic fashion.
This split in the community, which became organized into two opposing
groups, was led by equally aggressive leaders. The issue of community
government policy was one point of disagrecent. Not only was there
opposition to a Nisei elected community council, ?ut there was also
opposition to the establishment of any kind of representative system
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which would cx>operate with the War Relocation Authority in adminis-
tration of the centers. ~e pro-American group, largely Nisei aI¥:l
JACL, was equally vociferous in its support of self-government. The
project director, with the assistance and advice of members of hie
staff am evacuee leaders, appointed a commission to prepare a plan of
governm«1t. The conm1ssion was so constituted that it included both
Issei and Nisei, but did not include radicil leadership from the two
opposing factions. It was hoped that through this device acceptance
could be secured for the establishment of a community council.
After several weeks of deliberation, this commission finally pro-
duced a document which YfaS approved by the project director and ready
for submission to the people of Manzanar. An educational program was
started for the purpose of informing the people of its provisions and
to secure pre-election approval. It soon became apparent, however, that
with opposition so widespread, any charter would be rejected by the
voters. This opposition was based on the belief held by a number of
Issei that the provision limiting membership to Nisei was the responsi-
bility of certain 1Ianzanar individuals and was not a policy established
by the WRA. There was fear that this Nisei group would gain control of
the cooperative enterprises which at that time were Issei dominated.
It was also believed that the council would supplant the block managers
who were largely Issei and in whom the residents had a considerable
amount of confidence.
As a result of this opposition, it was decided to postpone the
election and to call for the election of a new group of block delegates,
who would take the plan of government prepared by the organization com-
mission-and make such amendments and changes as were possible. An elec-
tion was held. The new delegates were unanimously opposed not only to
the plan of government prepared by the organization commission, but ilso
to any form of local government which might be proposed. The adminis-
trative attempts to salvage community government for Manzanar were
abruptly halted by the riot of December 6, and subsequently no serious
att~ts were ever mde to revive it.
Thus it was that a combination of passive opposition from the
block leaders, organized and violent conflict between segments of the
population, and misunderstanding and misinterpretation of specific
points of policy, were responsible for the failure to establish com-
munity governMnt at lfanzanar. Many of the same factors and conflicts
appeared at other centers, but through more s1d.llful handling and a
better opportunity for opposing groups to resolve their differences, it
was possible to achieve an acceptable plan of government.
C. Administration Attitudes toward COIIDnunity Government Policy
The disturbances at Uanzanar and Poston prompted admirnstrative
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concern in Washington about policies on coIIll1unity goverrunent and the
whole field of administration-evacuee relationships. In December, a
confidential memorandum was addressed to all project directors request-
ing their judgment and recOIIBIlendations on the local goverrunent program..
The point was made that WRA was under no obligation to establish,
or permit establisl:anent of evacuee government, which policy was a lib-
eral interpretation of the directive from the President and was intended
to foster self-expression and participation in c~ty affairs on the
part of evacuees and to mobilize for administrative support the sanc-
tions of a deliberative and representative body of citizens. The
question was raised whether this policy should now be changed to WRA
regulatory .admini stration supplemented by a pUrely advisory cOlmnittee
of evacuees.
Comments were requested on Issei-Nisei participation on the
community council and participation of aliens short of election to the
council. Other items included an evaluation of the extent to which
callnunity government had proved or disproved itself; a statement of
who among the evacuees was either opposing or favoring community govern-
ment; and a request for suggested changes if a revision were thought to
be desirable. It was also stated that "no action to accelerate charter
commissions or other committees engaged in organizational 'Iork should be
taken." .
The r~lies from the several project directors reveal both the
attitudes o~ project administration and the administrative interpre-
tation of evacuee attitudes as of that time. Without exception, all
project directors stated that the most crucial issue in community
government policy was the provision prohibiting aliens from holding
elective office. Illustrative of project opinion are such statements
as:
"The Issei refuse to accept the administration's opinion
that citizens alone can hold office. They feel that
citizenship status is irrelevant in a relocation center
and since all Japanese were relocated and treated in a.
similAr manner, all should be entitled to hold office.
Had Issei been permitted to hold office, much of the
present unrest would have been obviated, the Issei
stated. Issei participation would have enabled than to
direct their energies into productive, loyal channels.
'~isei felt that the present organization tends to
intensify the growing cleavage between the t'lfO groups.
This cleavage is so significant that at times all issues
are decided within the COJDnunity solely on that basis
without reference to substance. While some Nisei are
(17f,")
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mwe have an impression that the presently recommended .
form ot government is not a completely genuine dele-
gation of authority to the colony to establish its own
controls. The pseudo-government existing, subject to
the pressure and cooperation of administration, has
such limitations that we believe it will be difticult
to secure a real participation or genuine authority in
the face of the realization by the colonists ot its
lack of complete transmission ot responsibility."
. The project director at Manzanar, approaching the same question
from a slightly difterent point of view, observed:
"Viewing the plan tor creation of evacuee sel£-government,
as an analyst and not as a critic, it now seems clear that
the position of the majority of the evacuees towards se~-
government deserves serious open-minded consideration by
the Authority. Evacuees who ~proach the plan of self-
government without anotion and with the desire to be
constructive, divide themselves roughly into two classes:
those who question the sincerity of a plan of self-
government which prohibits a lar~e percentage (and par-
ticularly the more mature people) from the holding of
office and the exercise of administrative authority, and
those who question the sincerity of any plan of self-
government prepared and limited by the authorities above,\ whose authority includes the maintenance of a barbed wire\ . fence as visual evidence of the actual complete lac!c of
the fundamentals of self-government. Their view boils
down to the conclusion that it is silly for mature men
to spend t!me playing with dolls. n
The almost t~anJ.mous desire of center administrators to retain
the policy of cODlDunity government essentially unchanged, except in /'
regard to Issei eligibility to elective office, allayed concern in the j
Washington office that ccmnunity councils might be contributory to the
disturbances which had occurred or might likely occur in the future.
Although the project directors found themselves defending the policy,-
their attitudes toward council groups were frequently those of dis-
interest or suspicion. Many of t!le administrative personnel felt that
canmunity gowrnment was a mean:Lngless gesture which could only cause
trouble and that a policy of laying dO1m rules and regulations and
enforcing them by authority was most desirable. These attitudes were
described in a report by Ted Haas, project attorney at Poston, 'in which
he said:
"Some officials at Poston have said to the staff and resi-
dents that it YIOuld have been easier to have nm the
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. . center dictator11y with all rules and policies established :
by the administration and without consultation with the i
residents, and that the administration of cCXIID.unity
government, democratic practices and evacuee participation
increased the difficulties of administering the center."
Caught between the pressures of divided and disorganized co~
munities and a critical or disinterested administration, the advocates
of conmunity government faced heavy odds in their efforts to bring
political organization to the centers. That they succeeded is testi-
mony to their perseverance and to the fact that there was basic need
for an instrument of this type as a coordinate of community life. It
was inevitable that some kind of systematic relations would develop
between the evacuees and the administration. It was not inevitable
that the organization or functions should confo~ to the policy
determined ~ the WRA, but the fact that this policy provided certain
guideposts and carried the sanctions of the administrators gave it a
decided advantage in the evolving system of relations. The alternative
was anarchy and a coercive and possibly terroristic underground.
The vast majority of residents were desirous of peace and stabil-
ity and were willing to make compromises to avoid trouble. Many
accepted community government as a device, imperfect at best, which
could allow for an orderly presentation of problems and resolution of
crises. Administrators found no such need to compromise. They held the
.full weight and authority of the Federal Government backed by police
power and the Army. They too could accept camnunity govenlment because
it held promise of proving a useful administrative tool, and might
contribute to law and ordero
).
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TROUBLED PERIOD
The early ronths of center life were tmcomfortable and disorgan-
ized at all centers, but not uniformly so. The centers which were opened
later in the year profited by the experiences of those which opened ear-
lier, so that the hardships of the occupation period were not so severe
for the last comers as for the first. However, the occupation and ad-
justment period at every project was one of worry, inconvenience, short-
ages in essential supplies and services and general physical discomfort.
Under these conditions grievances were plentiful, crises common.
It was at Poston and Manzanar, the first centers to open, that
crises developed to the stage of mass demonstrations involving the major-
ity of the residents and resulting in temporary suspension of normal ac-
tivities. At each of these centers a variety of issues, or minor crises,
arose simultaneously and merged into a major crisis. At other centers
this synchronization was lacking; in rost instances a grievance that
might be very real to one group within the community might not exist for
another group--or for any other group. Under these conditions there was
less likelihood of separate dissatisfactions melting into mass emotion,
and at the same time there was a much better opportunity for the adminis-
tration to reach an understanding with disaffected groups: in other words,
it was simpler for the an~~nistration to solve a problem involving the
people of one block, and then to adjust matters of another nature with
another block, than to be obliged to face a community which had been sol-
idly welded together in a common cause.
Once the early period of occupation and adjustment had been weath-
ered, such crises as developed were generally occasioned by the initia-
tion of some policy which had been administratively determined and imposed
upon the entire community. Not all policy determinations led to violent
community response, by any means, but there were a f~1 vital ones which
stirred up considerable resistance in some, if not all, of the centers.
The skill with which the ~ocal administration introduced these major pol-
icy determinations to the residents influenced the nature of the commun-
ity reaction.
A. Registration
Registration was the first of the administratively determined pol-
icies affecting all residents which produced a violent reaction. On
January 28,1943, Secretary of iYar Stimson announced that the War Depart-
ment would soon create an all-Nisei combat team, to be composed of Japan-
ese American volunteers from Hawaii and the mainland, including the Nisei
in the relocation centers. This decision was the result of much discus-
sion and planning on the part of both the 'ilRA and the war Department.
(37) .
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,and the program was underway that appeal was made to the councils. By
that time confusion was widespread. The response of the councils dif-
fered sharply from project to pro,ject.
At Heart Mountain resistance developed first among the Nisei,
some of whom protested both the segregated nature of the proposed com-
bat team and the propriety of inducting Japanese Americans into the
Army as long as their rights as citizens remained in doubt. The oppo-
sition was strong enough to make the administration question its abil-
ity to conduct any registration. An ultimatum issued by the project
director was politely ignored. Resistance spread to the non-citizens,
and meetings were organized among the residents to promote a united
front. At this point the block chairmen, a group composed of Issei
representatives, stepped into the picture and saved the day. A promi-
nent member of this group influe~~~d his own block to accept the reg-
istration program. With the resistance broken at this one point, other
blocks fell into line and the registration was completed without fur-
ther difficulty.
At Granada center, largely because of slci11ful handling by the
project administration, the registration proceeded with comparative
smoothness. However, even at Granada there was a point at which 100
citizens ,vere answering "No" to the loyaltJr question and only 30 had
volunteered. At this critical time the administration called in the
newly elected community council and explained to its members the im-
plications of the situation and the need for drastic action. The
chairman of the council was placed in telephone communication with the
War Department in Washington. Following this conversation, he organ-
ized a series of mass meetings at Which the volunteering program was
explained more adequately to the residents. Within a short time the.
number of volunteers increased to 152 and the number of negative an-
mlers declined to 27.
At Central Utah a tense situation developed when a considerable
number of citizens protested the registration on a civil rights basis
and demanded a clarification of these rights and of the status of the
proposed segregated unit. This faction drew up a petition stating its
grievances and objections and sent it on to Washington, whereupon the
council stepped forward, asserted its leadership and forwarded to Wash-
ington a second petition, declaring loyalty to the United States and
the desire of a substantial number of residents to serve in the armed
forces.
In all of the foregoing instances organized units of conmxunity
government, Issei, Nisei, or both, were able to contribute materially
to the solution of knotty problems. Tule Lake, in its registration
period, presented an unhappy contrast to that pattern. At Tule Lake,
as at other centers, original announcement of the impending registration
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,was made in the pro ject newspaper. On Tuesday morning, February 9, the
program was explained by the administration before a joint session of
the conununity council and the planning board. ht evening the ~Var De-
partment message was read at meetings held in seven mess halls, and it
was announced that registration would begin the next day. Duri..'1g the
days that followed, many meetings, large and small, '~re held by the
evacuees to discuss the implications and significance of registration.
Because of inadequate information, misinterpretation, and numerous ru-
mors and conjectures which swept through the center, only a few regis-
trants responded during the first week. The community council, in an
attempt to clarify the situation, sUbmitted a list of 150 questions to
the project director on February 13. Two days later the council and
the planning board held another joint meeting, at which they received
answers to 58 of the 150 questions, listened to the captain of the Army
team a s he read once again the \~r Department message, and were told by
the project director that he placed full responsibility upon them for
securing compliance with the registration requirements.
In the days that followed the situation went froffi bad to worse,
with large numbers of evacuees applying for repatriation or expatria-
tion to Japan. On February 18 registration headquarters were moved to
the administrative area, and an order was issued listing the sequence
in which blocks would be registered. On the 18th and 19th the great
majority of eligible young men failed to appear, whereupon the project
director and the Army officer in charge of registration visited the
blocks scheduled for registration and called out the names of the recal-
citrants. on the afternoon of the 19th a large delegation from three
blocks went to headquarters to present a letter requesting expatriation;
it was signed by the young men who had refused to register. On the 21st
of February the young men whose names had appeared on the letter were
arrested. Day by day more young men were arrested; day by day opposi-
tion to the registration became more highly organized and bold. Those
who had already registered were threatened by the opposition and were,
in some instances, beaten.
The council and planning board, in an attempt to counteract the
growing opposition prepared a memorandum which they submitted to the
project director for his approval. This memorandum was a plea to the
Nisei to make their own decisions about registration on an individual
basis and not to accept group decisions. The stencil was cut so that
mimeographed copies could be run off quickly as soon as the project
director approved the memo for distribution. On February 23 the
project director returned the memorandum, withholding his approval of
the plan to distribute it. The council and planning board were unwill-
ing to accept further responsibility for the registration unless certain
conditions were met, principally that the young men who had been arres-
ted should be released to the center. To this condition the project
director was unable to agree; he took the position that- the young men
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.were violaters of the Selective Service Act. Having failed in their
attempt to secure agreement of the project administration to their plan,
the community council and the planning board resigned. They stated that
this was the only course open to them because of the project director's
expressed lack of confidence in their good intentions and abilities.
The sequel to these events is well known. The community council
was never reestablished. Thousands of residents failed to register and
many hundreds requested repatriation or expatriation. Tule Lake was
eventually selected as the center to house segregants drawn from other
camps, and the flloyals" who braved coJmnunity censure to register were
transferred elsewhere.
Many lessons learned from registration influenced the initiation
of future policy and procedure. The e)q>erience brought keen awareness
of the necessity for adequate planning and communication. There was
also a realization of the need to understand the evacuee point of view,
awareness that the objectives and moral principles activating adminis-
tration were not always comprehensible to the evacuees. Although recog-
nition of the need for thorough understanding of any policy became a
fundamental consideration in future actions, the idea that evacuees
might participate in policy formulation was never accepted. Instead,
additional reliance was placed upon reports of project administrators
and the newly established community analysts as sources of information
about evacuee attitudes and probable reactions to policy.
, B. Misgivings in Washington
The incidents at Poston and Y~zanar focused the attention of the
National Director and his key staff members upon the issue of community
Government. ExistinS policy was held up for sharp scrutiny and reexaJn-
inationo On the basis of events at Poston and Manzanar, it was natural
to qQestion the ability of the community government to maintain law and
order, to prevent mass demonstrations or riots. Such legislative and
judicial functions as had been granted the councils, it was thought,
might better be transferred to the project director; in that event, how-
ever, the councils became rather meaningless, and the question arose as
to ~ether it might not be better to eliminate the entire system of com-
munity government and operate simply on a basis of evacuee advisory com-
mitteeso The questions submitted to the project directors on December
15, 1942, and referred to previously were indicative of this change in
thinking. In that communication the Director pointed out that the exis-
ting policy on community government represented a liberal interpretation
of the executive order and that ~mA was under no obligation to allow or
to encourage self-government in the centers.
It was unfortunate, if understandable, that the WRA administration
took the stand at this time that legislative and judicial functions were
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.beyond the abilities of the councils. In January steps were taken to
remove from conmunity government its sole responsibility for maintaing
law and order. The Director issued administrative instructions govern-
ing organization of police forces, establishing procedures for making
arrests and for the trial and punishment of offenders; a confidential
instruction outlined the procedure by which a project director could re-
move trouble-makers from the center.
In substance these instructions made the project director respon-
. sible for lawv and order; they did not remove the legislative or judicial
functions from the community council, but they provided that, until the
council should become competent to exercise such functions, the respon-
sibility for them would remain with the administration. The confiden-
tial instruction placed complete responsibility for handling cases of
individuals contributing to lawlessness and disorder with the project
director.
These instructions, signed by the Director and released during
the latter part of February 1943, relieved the anxiety of a considerable
portion of the WRA administrative staff, but at the same time they cre-
ated questions about What functions were left for the councils to per-
form. The position of the councils was not enviable at best during this
period, and the events of the spring did little to strengthen that
position.
The administration's confidence in the ability of the community
government organizations to resolve crises had been badly shaken by
the Poston and Manzanar incidents. Conditions which developed during
the spring were not favorable to bolstering such confidence as remained.
- \~, throughout the year of 1943 was under constant and increasingly
virulent attack from Congressional committees, legislative committees
in some of the Western states, the Hearst papers, the McClatchy papers,
the Denver Post, super-patriotic groups and many individuals. The up-
roar caused by registration continued through February and well into
VArch. The resignation of the council at rule Lake and the milder dis-
turbances at other c enters reduced still further the administration 's
faith in community gpvernment.
The councils at most centers, although cooperative and willing to
assist the administration in the crises, were too weak to direct the con-
flicting factions along constructive lines. The situation was further
complicated by the continuing departure of the more cooperative and ma-
ture Nisei, who were in some measure a counterbalance to the disruptive
and disloyal elements, from the centers to resume private life. Except
at one or two centers, no positive and cooperative leadership had devel-
oped among the aliens, Who, as a group, continued to be an unknown fac-
tor. This anonymity of the Issei was to a large degree the consequence
of their exclusion from active participation in community government.
(42)
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At any event, during this turbulent period groups of obstructionists
were pretty well beyond the control of both evacuee leaders and adminis-
tration. All these considerations favored WRA' s acceptance of the need
to extend administrative control.
Many of the administrative staff, both in Washington and at the
projects, were extremely apprehensive of the danger of future mass up-
risings. Some staff members were skeptical, disillusioned, or simply
disinterested in their attitude toward community government as a device
to bring stability and order to the center population. The extreme ele-
ment favored rigid, dictatorial regulation and expressed its sentiments
in such language as !fIt is our job to tell the Japs what to do and shoot
the bastards if they won't. 'I This extreme position, however, was not
held by the top administrators either at the projects or in iVashington.
However, the trend toward stricter administrative controls was pro-
nounced enough to cause the National Director to consider seriously rad-
ical change in the policy on community government, a change which would
have reduced the councils in status to the role of advisory boards.
This point of view was presented at a meeting held in Washington
in early April. In the course of the discussion that followed, it was
pointed out that such a change of policy would be regarded by the evac-
uees as a broken promise on ~VRAts part. A number of the staff members
expressed their conviction that community government could, given a
little more time, become a responsible and effective instrument. On the
other side it was argued that the steadily increasing relocation move-
ment made it impossible to create stable groups and that the evacuees
themselves were no longer concerned with community government. It was
agreed that the council had two major functions: one was to determine
what acts were injurious to the welfare of the community and to pre-
scribe penalties for the commission of such acts; the other was to
channel information between the evacuees and the administration. It was
recognized that the councils had thus far failed to enact legislation or
to establish judicial commissions, but at the same time it was admitted
that the recent issuance of the administrative instructions on offenses
removed the necessity for the councils to take immediate action in that
field. In regard to the second function, it was agreed that neither the
project director nor the evacuees had been encouraged or given opportu-
nity to make adequate use of this highly important representative func-
tion. As early as January, decision had been reached to revise the pol-
icy which denied elective office to the Issei. Further discussioR of
the matter at this April meeting resulted in the issuance of a definite
policy statement vlhich granted eligibility to elective office to the
Issei.
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C . The Proponents
During the first three months of 1943 a number of statements and
concrete proposals were offered for consideration. Their acceptance
would have liberalized policy in the direction of increased responsibil-
ity for the community goverrunents to aSSUL-ne. A memorandum prepared in
the Solicitor's office in January, in which a ttention was called to the
need for administrative instructions on trial and punishment of offend-
ers, organization of police services, organization of inte~igence,
rules to govern the making of arrests, and a program for segregating
aggravated trouble-makers ended with the comment hat although the sug-
gested measures were repressive in character, the successful solution of
law and order problems rested primarily with the administration. A mem-
orandwn to Mr. John Provinse from Mr. Solon T. K1Jnball on January 8,
1942, which discussed these proposals, said in part:
"My observation has been that our admLnistration has
been too 'good,' too perfect. We have over-planned
and over-directed. We have not allowed sufficient out-
let for aggressiveness through actual participation in
the business of running a project, so that the aggress-
iveness when expressed is against the 'loyal' group and
I suspect in the future may be directed against us. I
think we need to loosen up our administrative organiza-
tion to permit more of the planning (and mistakes) to
come from the bottom. Certainly we need much better
channels of communication to allow the steam to blow
off than we now have.
"I see in community goverrunent a goodly portion of the
answer to these two problEms-but we must have under-
standing from the key administrative people of what is
being done, and why, and how. In that connection, I
believe the creation of evacuee committees to study
special problems and ",,0 J.'ecommend solutions and policy
would be helpful. Specifically, we need one immedi-
ately to study the functions and operation of community
goverrunent. "
Additional memoranda were subniitted on January 15, covering com-
munity government policy, summarization of replies to the Director's
memorandum of December 15, 1942, Issei participation in the community
council, problems of community govenunent, and recomnendations on com-
munity government. The portion of the memorandum on problems confront-
ing community government pointed out the lack of unity in the evacuee
population and problems created by evacuation. It also recognized the
conflict of measurable self-government with administrative responsibil-
ity of the Authority. This memorandum said in part:
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-"Perhaps we should recognize the situation (the com-
plete administrative responsib~ity of the WRA) for
what it is and say that it will be impossible to ever
have a fully responsible government with opportunity
for implementing decisions by administrative action.
On the other hand, perhaps it is possible over a period
of time to extend to the evacuees a greater measure of
self-regulation and planning. If so, policy becomes
the formal recognition of an already existing achieve-
.ment. In other words, if the development of govem-
mental forms and responsibilities are not limited by
hard and fast boundaries, but permitted to meet new
needs, we m9.y achieve the type of dynamic living govern-
ment which expresses a real need and has a real meaning.
"Significant government, after all, should not consist
of an enumerated list of specified powers, but should
be the opportunity for people to concern themselves with
the problems which are of major concern in their lives.
Let us examine some of these problems and see vlhich of
them might possibly become a function of government. II
Some of the suggestions made included the establishment of an
evacuee police force under the supervision of the community council,
controls over food, the planning of productive efforts, the use of man-
power, adjustment of differences between Nisei, Issei, and Kibei, hous-
ing, health, education, relocation, and recreation.
This was followed in February by the preparation of an admip~s-
trative instruction on police services which visualized a dual system of
responsibility and organization. Under this plan, there would be estab-
lished an evacuee police force with its chief of police appointed by a
board of police commissioners. The evacuee policemen would have as
their responsibility the maintenance of law and order within the center
proper. There would also be a Caucasian police force to protect Govem-
ment property and enforce WRA regulations. This proposal was justified
on the grounds that the community council should have enforcing author-
ity for its legislative acts and its judicial system, and that the
attempt by WRA to impose responsibility for protection of Government
property or enforcement of regulations contrary to community interests
upon the evacuees, was inconsistent. This plan was rejected in favor of
an internal security force composed of both evacuees and Caucasians with
official responsib~ity resting on the Caucasian officers.
A recommendation to establish a position of administrative assist-
ant to the project director, whose responsibility would include the
general field of administrative community relationships with specific
6982330-46-4 (45)-
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responsibility for communit1 government, labor relations, and promotion
of understanding and participation of evacuees in the general problems
of relocation centers, was made the same month. This recommendation
was rejected b1 the Administrative Management Division on the grounds
that need for such a position did not exist and that these functions
belonged to the project director or his assistant.
Another proposal w01Jld have given responsibility for communit1
libraries to the conmunity council. The plan included the establish-
ment of a library board b1 the council with complete administrative con-
trol. This proposal also was turned down, but it was carried out in
effect by the committees at some centers.
It became apparent that self-government which would include the
assumption of administrative and supervisory responsibility for those
portions of relocation center life which were directly related to the
welfare of the residents, had become impossible of attainment. It also
became apparent that, if community government was to have a significant
function, it would have to come from a sl01v growth accompanied by dem-
onstration of responsibility and increased confidence by the policy-
makers, the administrators, and the people themselves.
The big task was to interpret the significant contribution which
community government could perform and to secure its implementation.
To this end, anphasis was placed upon the u,!:-ilization of the council as
a channel of communication for securing understanding of WRA policies
and the reflection of evacuee attitudes to these policies. This view
was expressed in a statement prepared for a proposed handbook of poliC1
to be issued by the Reports Division in April 1943. The statement, in
addition to listing the formal aspects of communit1 government, called
attention to this point as follows:
"The increased confidence in the council w:ill be con-
current with the exercise of the legislative authority
and the perfection of channels of communication between
residents and administration.
"In the perfonnance of this latter function lies the
opportunity for community government to weld together
and expres s the varying points of view wi thin the com-
munity. \'l'here this has been achieved the co~cn has
established direct relations with block organizations,
work groups and other interested groups -within the com-
munity. Through these relations the council is able to
encourage the expression of the needs and ideas and to
transmit these to the administration. This in turn has
facilitated understanding and solution of common problems
of COImnunity life."
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It was not until April that the first letter to the project di-
rectors suggesting a direct contact with the community council was sent
from iVashington. Previous to this time, communications which involved
evacuees usually included a phrase, suggesting that the project director
"consult evacuee leaders." This in itself was a failure to recognize
the community council as the primary point of contact with the evacuee
conununity.
The letter in question suggested consultation vdth councils on
relocation and the appointment of a committee to consider problems re-
lated to this program. It is perhaps significant that project directors
were the ones Who appointed the relocation committees and that they
were orten inactive.
D. Attitudes of Project Staffs
During the same period that a reorientation \~s taking place in
the thinking in Washington, the project administrators, with a few ex-
ceptions, remained dubious as to the value of coJmnunity government.
Minidoka, which had no temporary council, replied to an inquiry from
Washington urging action, by letters from most of the top administrative
officials. These letters disclosed that the administrative staff was
nearly unanimous in favoring a system of advisors to the project direc-
tor in lieu of coJmnunity government and expressing the opinion that dif-
ficulties at other centers might be due to the presence of community
councils. These administrators felt that there had been a considerable
measure of evacuee participation and that it was unwise to change the
present system. Included in these letters were four written by evacu-
ees, all of which were in favor of community government, and no one of
which referred to any past participation in the affairs of the project.
At centers where councils were organized there was a pattern of
bypassing or ignoring the council group. At Gila River, the attitude
was expressed by the project attorney that coJmnunity government was a
plaything and n.:!aningless. The project director there consulted ,'dth
members of the temporary council, the block managers, or any other group
which he designated. At Granada, the project director had appointed an
advisory committee of five, the fUnctions of which paralleled those of
the community council. At Rohwer and Jerome, the Block Managers were
as frequently as, or more often consulted on center problems than was
the community council. Central Utah provided an exception to this
general situation. There the project director followed a consistent
policy of consultation and kept the council informed of administrative
and community problems. A functioning system of coJmnunication had
evolved at Colorado River as a result of the November incident. -
Part of the explanation for this confused situation was the
failure of project administrators to recognize the functions of the
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-community council as separate and complementary to those of the adminis-
tration. The residents were similarly uninformed and had little confi-
dence in the council to secure amelioration of existing conditions.
With each new crisis, rump groups were organized to negotiate with the
project director. The administration, by consulting with such rump
groups, further contributed to the ineffectiveness of the representative
function of the council.
There were, however, some bright spots in this generally dis-
couraging picture. From Central Utah came a letter from the chairman
of the community council, prepared in response to a letter from the
chairman of the council at Colorado River, and containing some proposals
which had considerable influence on subsequent policy. Some of the more
interesting and significant suggestions and requests made by the chair-
man in March of 1943 are quoted below:
"(1) To be given the opportunity to have representative
in ~7ashington to form the over-all i1RA policy particu-
larly with ~hasis on the budget which will be soon
passed by the Congress.
"(2) To make a request to obtain transportation eJq)en-
ses to job destinations and also a machinery to secure
temporary loan after arriving. This, because of the
fact that most evacuees are without sufficient fUnds.
"(3) Request to the Viar Department, WRA and other
governmental agencies not to penalize 'teen-agel youths
without giving them the opportunity to correct them-
selves. This is in connection with the recent ~gis-
tration because of .the fact that they had difficulty
in making their decisions and also on account of their
youth and iJDnaturity.
"(4) Concern over the possible and probable chaos in
the sense of manpower shortage within the center as a
result of the operation of the policy to relocate.
Would it not be possible to conduct a survey to determine
the possible future labor condition in order to forestall
that possibility prior to its actual happening? ,11
Although it was not considered feasible to grant the first re-
quest, careful attention was given to the remaining recommendations.
lExtract from letter of Tsune Baba, Chairman Topaz Community Council to
Project Director Charles F. Ernst, Central Utah Relocation Center, March'
13, 1943. 
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Shortly thereafter VmA began paying transportation expenses and making I
leave assistance grants to relocating evacuees. Hearings were given
those evacuees who wished to revise the answers to the controversial
questions put to them in the confused period of registration, and ad-
justments were made in the project employment program to offset the
drain on center manpower caused by the increasingly vigorous relocation
program.
E. Extending Representation to the Issei
The exclusion of the Issei from elective office had proved a
constant stumbling block to the evacuees in their attempts to e,stablish
pe~anent government. In the course of time, and with the tacit approv-
al of project officials, a semi-satisfactory solution to the problem was
being achieved at various centers.
Poston, Granada, Rohwer, and Jerome had established Issei adviso-
ry boards, which were complementary to the temporary coJllllunity councils.
At Heart Mountain and Granada, the attempts to ~ecure approval of an
upper advisory elected group of Issei had been disapproved by Washing-
ton. The discrimination was overcome at Granada, hO\vever, by an agree-
ment that the block managers would be a completely Issei group and the
resignation of the Nisei then serving in that capacity. Heart Mo1.U1tain
had met the situation by preparing a charter which gave to the community
council powers far greater than those provided in the policy statement.
The rejection of this charter by the administration led to a period of
non-a.ctivity and status quo with Issei block ~en as representative
of the residents. Manzanar had given up all intentions of attempting
to establish comm1.U1ity government and the project administration was
using block managers as the channel of communication with the evacuees.
Central Utah had appointed a number of Issei to various committees and
IIBny were block managers. At Minidoka, an advisory group, alDX>st
entirely Issei in composition, was consulted by the administration.
The solution of Issei representation at Tule Lake was solved by
the establishment of a planning board. This board was formally estab-
lished with a charter setting forth its membership, organization, and
responsibilities. The preamble of this charter was a clear statement
of the intention of the residents to meet the problem of lack of Issei
representation. It read:
'~ecause of the WRA ruling that no Issei shall serve
on the community council, there has been a feeling
that the former has not been adequately represented.
In the face of such facts, it has become necessary
that some kind of an Issei organization be formulated
to assist the council in the community affairs."
.
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The planning board was originally initiated by a resolution of
the tempOrary community council and its charter closely paralleled
the charter 01' the council. Its membership was entirely Issei.
Each block elected one representative, and the representatives from the
seven wards selected from their number one member to serve on the
planning board. The election was by popular vote, and all residents
were eligible as electors. The planning board was advisory with direct
channels of communication with the project director, the community
council, and the residents. Provision was also made for appointment of
a staff to be composed of one Issei, one Nisei, and one Kibei. The
purpose of the staff was to gather the necessary information to permit
the planning board to take constructive action. It also provided that
the executive secretary and one other manber of the council would main-
tain pe~nent contact with the board. A memorand\m1 prepared in
Washington in January 1943 said in part:
"The organization of the board and the procedures for
infiuencing and determining public opinion are as
truly democratic as could be wished for. The positive
character of the board to investigate and plan for the
betterment of the community is commendable. Lastly,
the utilization of Issei participation in a complemen-
tary and not competitive manner may be the solution to
our problem of community government. The Issei may be
and probably are the real power in the CODmlunity, but
Lher,] they operate in organized and systems-tic malUler
for the betterment of the community and provide advice
to the younger and more American Nisei group."
These attempts on the part of the evacuees to meet the realistic
need for Issei representation, together with the recommendations from
project personnel and a clearer appreciation of the problem in Washing-
ton, were contributing factors to the decision to change the policy of
Issei representation. Among those in Washington were some who origi-
nally favored the inclusion of the Issei and had gone along hesitantly
with the original policy. They, too, pressed for a change in this
direction.
The amendment o Administrative Instruction 34 opening the way
for Issei participation was signed by the Director on April 19, 1943.
The change in policy was justified in a prefatory statement which
pointed out that continued departure of the more mature leaders among
the citizen evacuees who had taken an active part in community affairs,
left the younger and ilmDature citizens, who were not as well qualified,
to assume the responsibilities of community government. It also pointed
out that as this process continued, the alien evacuees would constitute
an increasingly great majority of the mature population. For that
reason, it was advisable to modify the policy previously followed by
.
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extending to the Issei eligibility for elective office.
An air mail letter announcing the change in policy was sent to
all project directors on April 23. This letter pointed out that the
change should receive favorable reception. The change was conceived as
a liberalization of policy in response to the desires and wishes of the
community and the recommendations of the staff. Reference was made to
some of the fears expressed by various administrative people. These
included the election of a preponderance of Issei members, a loss of
prestige by the citizens, extensive use of the Japanese language, and
emphasis on Japanese social characteristics. The benefits seen were
'~ringing Issei leadership, that might have been driven underground,
into the open; the more experienced Issei will cooperate better in
solving problems; the loss through relocation of the best Nisei and
probable decline of quality of council membership and work will be
offset; the broadening of the base of representation is in line with
democratic principles and aims placing responsibility for a stable
community on all."
The announcement was made at the centers on May 5 and had an
immediate desirable effect. Within the following three months, charters
were submitted and voted upon by the residents of six centers--Rohwer,
Jerome, Colorado River, Gila River, and Heart Mountain. All gave
approval to the plan of government which included Issei eligibility to
hold office. Minidoka, too, voted on a charter but througb a combi-
nation of factors it was defeated. At a subsequent election it was
approved.
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-CHAPTER V
THE WAY AHEAD
By the swmner of 1943, commlU1ity goverrunent had jJnproved its
status with both evacuees and administrators. The administration was
turning DJ>re frequently and extensively to the councils as a medium of
communication with the residents. Project staffs had learned that the
councils and council groups were as eager as themselves to have a well-
ordered community and that the councils could lend real assistance in
meetL"1g some problems.
COnBnUtuty understanding and acceptance of the representative
system had similarly increased as the channels through the council to
the administration became better known and more frequently used. The
residents began to look to their representatives to bring problems of
the community to the attention of the administration.
The projects had become better organized. The flo\1 of goods and
services had become sufficiently routinized so that the inefficiencies
and unmet needs could be placed in a perspective of relative importance.
l~ny of the residents had settled do\¥n to an existence that was gener-
ally endurable and from which there grew certain satisfactions and
benefits. They had learned the limitations of expectancy although many
anxieties were still reflected from time to time. These anxieties con-
cerned food, health, employment, education and recreationo They were
, the normal concerns of a group that had little control over the events
which shaped their lives, and that feared what little they had might be
taken awaY' or greatlY' curtailed.
The increasing success with which the council was able to secure
remedial measures in some areas and to provide an understanding of
limitations in others contributed to a growing sense of security.
A. Segregation
There were, however, anxieties which rose and fell in intensity
with each new move or change in policy by the I"IRA. One such anxiety
was the fear that the Government would decide upon a policy of segre-
gation and forced relocation. Rumors were current in manY' projects,
during registration, that the Government would separate the "disloyals"
from the "loyals," and then would disperse the "loyals" throughout the
coWltry. This rumor was a contributing factor to the large number of
people who sought refuge by staying at rule lAke during segregation and
to the large number of repatriation requests made at other centers by
families who, to avoid enforced relocation, sought a haven with the
"disloyals. "
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Following registration and the disclosure that large numbers had
requested repatriation and others had answered the loyalty question in
the negative, agitation for segregation increased from many directions.
Pressure was placed on the WRA by the Army, Congressional committees,
the JACL, administrative personnel, and by the evacuees themselves.
The decision to segregate was announced in early July. Previous to this
time, however, the Washington staff had been engaged in discussing the
plans and policies for segregation and the administration of a segre-
gation center. 'llie decision was welcomed by most project personnel as
a solution to the difficult problem of administering a center composed
of groups which appeared to be diametrically opposed in their ultimate
objective. One segment of the evacuees had declared for Japan or
against the United States, and the other for America.
Segregation ms in reality a step in the direction of securing
the voluntary relocation of all evacuees. It was the hope of the WRA
officials that upon completion of segregation, it would be possible to
gain widespread official and public acceptance for the loyal evacuees,
to remove many of the security restrictions at relocation centers, and
thus reduce center population materially by relocation and dispersal of
the residents throughout the country.
The entire program was carefully prepared and contingencies were
provided for. Both IVashington and the centers had learned many useful
lessons from the confused period of registration, and strenuous efforts
were made to insure complete understanding of the objectives and plans
necessary to accomplish the regrouping of people according to their
national sympathies. A meeting of project directors was held in Denver
the latter part of July. Policies and procedures were carefully studied
to insure complete understanding. Preparations w1der way at the centers
even before the project directors' meeting were given impetus by the
return of the project directors from the Denver conference. Two of the
project directors, acting upon a suggestion made at the Denver meeting,
called upon their community councils for major assistance. At other
centers, the roovement was under the direct supervision of the adminis-
trative staff with the assistance of the block managers and in some
instances an advisory group drawn from the council, and often from the
segregants themselves.
The organization of the movement at Central Utah, where the
cormnunity council was given a major share of responsibility, is of
 interest as an example of the operation 6f the principles of joint
participation and responsibility. There, the project director, follow-
ing receipt of information on segregation, established a staff group
called the Administrative Transfer Committee. His next step was to
inform the representatives of the community council of the new policy.
The comnunity council immediately called block meetings, 3t which this
lnfonnation was passed on and the segregants elected one of their
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members to be a representative. Thirty-four blocks sent representa-
tives to a Transferee Committee. This group elected a chairman who in
_turn appointed five members from the colmnittee to serve as the execu-
tive group. The community council delegated to a Community Cooperative
Committee of five members the responsibility for representing the
remainder of the residents.
Since the movement involved both the transfer of people from
Central Utah and the reception and induction of people from Tule Lake,
there was a division of community functions. The Transferee Committee
was primarily concerned with facilitating the smooth D¥)vement of their
group from the center, while the council committee was concerned with
the reception of the incoming Tule takers. During the several weeks
of preparation and movellient, the General Transfer Committee, canposed
of the Administrative Transfer Committee, the Transferee Committee, and
the Conmlunity Cooperative ConInittee were in almost continuous consul-
tation on problems connected with the total segregation movement.
The merit of this plan of organization was the adequate channel-
ing of communication through the colmnunity council and the Transferee
Camnittee direct to each individual ~gregant. The organization
achieved not only communication but also effective planning and action.
Through this organization, the segregants selected from among their awn
members the train monitor, car captains, and others having responsibili-
ties during the trip. As a result of carefully developed plans with
full participation of the conmunity, the movement of Tule lake-bound
segregants was accomplished without difficulty.
The Conmunity Cooperative Committee ke;pt the council and through
it the residents informed of plans and developments and secured their
cooperation. Through the Special Events Committee of the council, plans
were made for welcoming the newcomers. Two or three days after the
arrival of each train, a special program under the sponsorship of the
council was arranged for the benefit of the new people. This committee
also cooperated in the reception and induction procedures. The incoming
people were met at the gate by the Boy Scouts I drum and bugle corps,
escorted to the induction center where light refreshments were served,
and then directed to their permanent or temporary quarters.
The organization of the movement at the Rohwer center was simi-
lar to that at Central Utah. There a committee of the community council
am a committee of segregants worked in close collaboration with the
project administration in effecting all plans, thus winning favorable
comment from the project director.
Segregation was an important event in the development of commu-
nity government. Its chief importance rested in the removal from the
centers of a number of people who were actively opposed to any fo~ of
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cooperation with the project administration. This removal made possi-
ble the hastening of the development of a common basis of action for
all center residents by themsel?es and the WRA. Project administration,
with the removal of many who were suspected by the administration of
being actual or potential trouble~rs, was more disposed to have
confidence that a cormnunity council could handle internal problems.
The active cooperation of the councils at two centers, and to a lesser
extent elsewhere, provided a sound basis for future cooperative aetion.
B. The Policy of Relocation
Even before the completion of segregation, preliminary discus-
sions and plans were being developed in Washington for the initiation
of an all-out program of relocation. These plans included staff
reorganization, the expansion of the field service" and a concentrated
program of inf~tion directed at the American public and the evacuees.
The reorganization included the separation of the relocation function
from the ~loyment Division and the establishm~t of the Relocation
Division. Field offices were expanded and increased in number. Citi-
zens' canmittees were organized and understandings reached with local,
state, and national agencies and organizations.
The Authority recognized that" so long as the West Coast con-
tinued to be closed to evacuees, it was impossible to achieve a com-
plete depopulation of the centers. However, it was expected that many .
thousands would leave quicldy under new relocation procedures. iftlen
this expectation did not materialize, it was a considerable shock to
many- vm.A officials to learn that, in spite of desirable economic oppor-
tunities, good public acceptance, and continued relaxation of security
measures by the Army" many, if not most of the evacuees, preferred the
familiar institutional life of a relocation center to the uneJq>erienced
condition of life in an unfamiliar American connnunity. The enigma. of
people choosing the security behind barbed wire and armed guards rather
than the freedom of normal society was not easily understood. It was
felt by many that a combination of pressure, salesmanship" and incen-
tives 1K)u1d do the job.
'nle real deterrents to relocation were little understood at that
time. One of the most important of these factors was the belief held
by many evacuees that there would be a negotiated peace. Many, e~-
cially among the Issei, thought that they would I'eceive special consid-
eration under the peace treaty terms which would reimburse them for
their loss and reestablish them in as favorable, if not more desirable"
status than had been theirs before evacuation. An additional and important
factor was an intense fear of personal and economic insecurity on the
outside. These fears included those of physical violence, destruction
of property, and economic discrimination. There was also a fair-sized
group which had found in the centers greater security and more comforts
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than it had known before and was not eager to relinquish these advan-
tages. The Authority approached the problem on the basis of the need
to create interest, to point to the desirability of relocating, to
acquaint the evacuees with the advantages of particular localities or
occupations, and to provide services for those who decided to leave.
Beginning in September and continuing for se-weral IIDnths, many
of the Wasl1ington staff were almost continuously engaged in discussing
the pros and cons of relocation, resistance to relocation, organization,
procedures, policies, and the like. As agreement evolved, reorganiza-
tion was seen as the initial step. There was also recognized, however,
the need to set objectives for the relocation program and to secure
their acceptance by both the project staff and the evacuees; to provide
channels of communication to the evacuees and to secure their participa-
tion in a relocation program; and to implement the program with policies
and procedures. It was believed that through organization, to provide
services, an educational program to stimulate thinking about the future,
and the removal of psychic blocks through counseling, many more would
leave the centers.
From these discussions there emerged three memoranda which con-
tained the philosophy, organization,' and plans for relocation. A con-
siderable portion of these memoranda recognized the need for evacuee
participation and understanding of the relocation program if it were to
L .succeed. The memorandum of October 28 recognized this need in a sen-
I tence which read: "A progressive relocat'ion program can be achieved
only through the full and canplete participation and cooperation of the
evacuee population; and there should be increased delegation of respon-
sibility to the conmunity council and other evacuee groups to make
their participation possible."
This idea was elaborated by an additional conment quoted below:
.
,r "The future of the evacuees is of greater concern to them
than to anyone else, and they should fully Share in plan-
ning their relocation. This should be borne in mind in
carrying out the relocation program, and evacuee cooper-
ation should be secured through delegation of responsi-
bilities. Since the council is elected to represent the
community, it is essential that it be involved in the
relocation planning, and other representative evacuee
groups may have additional contributions to make. The
first step in evacuee participation might well be the
determination by the council of the answers to certain
basic problems that will affect future participation"
such as:
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"(1) Kind of organization that Should be established
by the camnunity council to deal with reloca-
tion problems for the evacuee community, with
full consideration given existing evacuee
relocation committees.
"(2) The relationship of the community council and
evacuee relocation committees to project staff
functions in connection with relocation.
"(3) The nature and extent of the responsibility
that may be effectively delegated to the c~
munity council (and the evacuee community)
in connection with the reloC'a.tion program.
"It is recognized that plans for greater evacuee par-
ticipation are well under way at some projects, and
suggestions and comments of project directors and
community councils growing out of their experience will
be welcomed. Extra copies of this letter are being
sent to you under separate cover so that you can makethem available to the council."
The suggestion was also made that a national conference of
evacuee representative-those at the centers, those who had relocated,
and Japanese Americans who had never been in relocation centers-should
be held, the purpose of which conference '~ould be to draw the atten-
tion of the Japanese Americans to the larger problems of relocation, to
stimulate them to plan for the eventual absorption into American life
of all persons of Japanese descent and to form the basis for a compre-
hensi ve as simila tion program."
A memorandum of November 8 elaborated on the earlier statements
and provided a detailed plan for achieving the objective of joint plan-
ning between the staff and the evacuees. Full recognition was given to
the community council as representatives of the evacuees and as the
group which Should assume a ma.jor responsibility in the planning'efforts. .
The plan provided for 'the establishment of a Relocation Planning
Commission to be appointed by the community council and to be composed
of representatives of various resident groups. This commission would
then select an executive secretary. The project director was to appoint
a Relocation Committee composed of staff members with the relocation
program officer as its executive secretary. Three representatives of
each of these groups were to constitute the Relocation Executive Board
with the relocation officer as the executive secretary and with the
executive secretary of the Relocation Planning Commission as an
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ex-ofticio member.
The function of the evacuee commission was "to coordinate the
efforts of the various committees (of the council), to prepare regular
reports of progress, to receive suggestions for improvement of the
pro~, and to transmit these suggestions and reports to the Reloca-
tion Executive Board."
l11e Relocation CoImnittee had as its responsibility "Planning am
cOOrdinating the contribution of the various divisions and the sections
to relocation. It will develop procedures and provide general guidance
tor all coordinated operations. It w:U1 prepare and submit reconmen-
dations to the project director on ch&~es in organization or program
emphasis which lead to better working relations between the divisions
and sections. It will be responsible for planning active participation
of all staff members and utilizing interests and capabilities of all
persons in whatever capacity."
'n1e responsibilities of the Relocation EDcutiTe Board were
planning, coordination, and guidance. In this capacity, it would make
recommendations to the project director for transmission to washington
for changes in policy or pro~, and to secure approval of policies
and plans as they operated in the center. It 'M>uld define responsibili-
ty of the staff and evacuee groups, develop cooperative relationships,
determine the sequen~e of phases of the program, and work out details
implementing agreements or resolving disagreements.
Further implementation of this more aggressive relocation policy
was spelled out in a manorandum on welfare counseling issued November
9, 194.3. This memorandum called attention to the individual and family
problems of a social nature which were basic in relocation resistance.
It also developed a plan for individual and family counseling and put
the responsibility on the welfare section. Its objectives were to
assist evacuees in developing plans for relocation, to furnish infor-
mation on the resources of communities to which evacuee might go, to
gather basic family data which could be transmitted to the appropriate
relocation office when a family relocated, and to provide WRA with
information for an over-ali program. It was not intended that the
family counseling pro~ should be used as a pressure technique to
force people to relocate. Its major objective was the transmittal of
reliable infonna tion to the people counseled and, through the inter-
viewing technique, to relieve them of many psychological blocks.
A detailed approach to secure cODlnunity acceptance for family
counseling and to facilitate interviewing was included as a part of
this document. It provided that the head counselor of the welfare
section should discuss the program With the community council and, 
having secured its understanding and acceptance, ask for the appointment 
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of a counseling coJlmdttee to work nth the wellare section. ntis can-
mittee would also be thoroughly info~d of the objectives and tech-
niques of counseling, and would assume responsibility for advising the
welfare section on its approach and also for f~liariz1ng the residents
with the objectives and the basis of scheduling interviews. It was
proposed that intervienng be conducted on a block basis and that pre-
vious to ~heduling interviews a thorough understanding and acceptance
on the part of the residents should be achieved. The block manager
would then schedule "each family in his block for the welfare section.
This procedure would be repeated block by block until the interviewing
program had been completed.
These plans represented the mat comprehensive and detailed
attempt ever made by the WRA to bring joint efforts to bear on the
solution of a common problem. Their description will help us to under-
stani the subsequent events and to evaluate the kiOO of relationships
existing between the arlministrative staff, the comlmmity council, am
the evacuees. I
IThe failure of this plan to work as it was outlined rests upon a
history of past relationships, inability to develop organization, and a
lack of unders'tanding between some staff members and the evacuees. 'l11e
plan was partially successful. However, a year and one-half later, the
welfare section "ws's still engaged in conducting interviews or re-inter-
viewing families where an inadequate first interview had been held. A
year later one of the centers established its first evacuee relocation
commission. Another center which had made a number of unsuccessful
attempts to secure evacuee participation finally concluded that its
attempts were useless. Counseling was divided between the welfare
section and the relocation diVision and in actual operation assumed a
character far different from what was originally intended.
Generally speaking, the response to the plan for the organiza-
tion of staff-evacuee relocation groups indicated better understanding
than that accorded other portions of these documents. Project directors
did appoint staff committees to discuss problems of relocation even
though, with a few exceptions, these committees were inactive within a
short period. The failure came largely from an inability to convince
participating staff manbers that they could make a significant contri-
bution to the total relocation program by going beyond their regular
duties. At these meetings, the relocation officer made a report of
relocation progress, and new policies and procedureg. 'l11is was not the
function envisaged for them in the original statement.
Several of the community councils established relocation planning
commissions. Again, however, there was considerable misunderstanding
and misinterpretation on the part of both the administrative people and
the evacuees of the function of this group. At some centers, the
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reloca tion officer attempted to utilize the group as a channel for
pressuring people to relocate. When the commission resisted his efforts
to convert them to his propaganda program, he either lost interest or
decided that the commission was useless.
Evacuee participation in relocation planning was a half-hearted
gesture at several centers. An active relocation commission was
already functioning at Rohwer and Gila River. At both these centers,
these groups were directly related to or were creations of the community
council rather than of the administration. Commissions were eventually
started at all other centers except Manzanar. The one at Central Utah
was never very active and defined its activities narrowly. The Granada
colmnission was originally a creation of the administration, and only
after several months did it become identified with the council. It was
not until the fall of 1944 that an evacuee relocation group was estab-
lished at Poston.
In one respect, these evacuee groups achieved a much larger
measure of success than might under the circumstances have been antici-
pated. For one thing, relocation was not a popular subject among the
evacuees, and it was with some difficulty that evacuees were persuaded to
serve with these groups. There was the ever present fear, which was
frequently justified, that these evacuee groups would become subject to
administrative pressure of a kind that was unpopular within the center.
The attempt on the part of some relocation supervisors to place respon-
sibility for drumming up trade for the relocation office with the evacu-
ee groups was resisted and was a perversion of the original intent. The
fact that these commissions survived the staff relocation committee and
were generally more active indicates that they did meet a need in the
community. At those projects where the relocation officer met frequent-
ly with the conlllissions and kept them infonned of policy and problems,
there' was a much better response. The failure of administrative leader-
ship was in large measure responsible for these groups failing to
assume the role intended for them.
A third factor contributing to the lack of widespread partici-
pation was the inability of the we1£are section to initiate its program
of family counseling within a reasonable period of time. Several months
passed before personnel had been recruited and decisions made as to the
data to be gathered in the family interviews. When the centers were
finally infonned of what was desired, it appeared to many people,
including the evacuees, that the counseling pro~ was in effect
another registration. As such it encountered considerable opposition.
Furthermore, there is no record that any welfare section ever attempted
to enlist the support of the community in the systematic manner outlined
in the memorandum of November 9. By the time the interviewing unit did
get under way, its original purpose had been greatly modified and a
large portion of the operational job and personnel had been allocated to
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the relocation division.
The inapility to achieve the objectives of evacuee participation
in a relocation program vias due to many factors inherent in the total
situation. These factors included a set pattern of managerial direction
and supervision by an administrative staff and the failure to appreci-
ate or understand the useful potentialities of consultation with evacu-
ees through organization in the achievement of a goal. There was also
the difficulty of definition of objectives. The administrative staff
was primarily interested in moving increasingly large numbers of people
out of the centers. Many of the evacuees were not interested in leav-
ing the centers under the conditons then existing, and others were
unwilling to leave under any conditions.
Although this situation was fully recognized in the three memo-
randa discussed above and although procedures were developed to break
down opposition, a common interpretation at the projects was that this
new program really meant increased pressures to get more people to IIK)~.
Many of the actions of the national office of WRA began to be inter-
preted by project administrations and evacuees alike as evidence that
people were going to be forced out of the centers. This attitude,
justified or not, did much to intensify feelings of insecurity and to
prevent such discussion as might lead to a commitment to leave the
center. There was also the failure on the part of the Viashington office
to 'provide adequate implementation with personnel and procedures to
initiate the counseling program in such a way that its objectives could
be understood by the coJIDllunity.
There was, however, one immediate response from the evacuees.
There dewloped a demand for a conference of center delegates to dis-cuss problems of relocation and relocation centers. ~
C. The Abortive Evacuee Conference
The first serious attempt to secure evacuee participation on a
major policy problem, that of relocation, evoked wide interest at several
centers. The suggestion in the Director's letter of October 28, 1943, that a national conference of evacuee and WRA officials might be desir- 
able was followed up by a resolution of the community council at Heart
Mountain favoring such a proposal. This resolution was adopted by the
council November 30, transmitted to the National Director, and copies
sent to all other centers requesting their support. A similar resolu-
tion from Rohwer and concurrence from councils at other centers caused
officials in Washington to give serious consideration to such a meetinge
Agreement was reached with the Director that the WRA would spon-
sor a national evacuee conference on relocation the latter part of -
January 1944 in Chicago. It Vfas arranged that each center should send
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opportunity to discuss full7 the manifold problems which
the evacuees are facing, same mutual agreement could be
reached on the nature of the problems and of action that
could alleviate or help r~edy the situation.
"Delegates would undoubted17 wish to present from their
point of view the many and complex problems facing the
evacuees. Family adjustment, economic security, social
acceptance, and the post-war ~rld would all come in
for their share of discussion. There should also be
constructive discussion where plans and programs could
be proposed that would work to remove as many as possible
of the hindrances which the evacuees saw facing them.
"Since these problems are also of primary concern to the
Authority, there would be an opportunity for mutual
exchange of constructive ideas. An opportunity would
also be afforded for a statement of our relations with
Congress and the American people, the expenditure of
money and the legal controls and responsibilities which
we must carry. A review of the legal standing of the
evacuees as presently interpreted by the courts could be
given. The limitations which surround any Federal pro-
gram and their specific application to the program of
the war Relocation Authority could be presented."
This conunun1cation stated al., that the \IRA 1YOuld assume the
responsibility of acting as a clearing house for statements prepared by
various councils. It was assumed that by circulation of these various
doc~nts fran center to center it would be possible to reach agreement
on the fundamental issues to be placed on the agenda of such a meeting.
.A. counter-proposal came fran the Heart Mountain councll-which
had taken the initiative in a letter of February 9. It suggested that
the conference should be held at the Granada Relocation Center from
March 6 to 17, 1944, and that the first half of this period should be
limited in attendance to the evacuee delegates. It pointed out that the
8.Jq>ense of holding a. meeting in Chicago was so great that it wo~d rork
a real hardship. The letter concluded with the assurance that Heart
Mountain would send its delegates to a conference ~ere and when the
conference is called and regardless of expense. The main thing is to
call the conference and call it as soon as possible." In a letter of
February 22, the Heart Kountain cotJIlcil reiterated the need for a
national conference am proposed the establishment of small family-type
hostels in key cities to house from 50 to 100 families. It recommended
financial assistance which might be secured by pooling the resources of
the center cooperatives.
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In the meantime, however, the Washington office of WRA had
decided that the conference should be postponed indefinitely. The
decision was based upon two facts: (1) the current unrest in the centers
over the operation of Selective Service; and, (2) the recent transfer of
fYRA to the Department of the Interior: the administration was not yet
sure of the degree to which the transfer would affect the Authority's
policy-ma1cing powers.
The question of a national conference was finally disposed of by
an administrative notice issued April 15, which, in addition to pointing
out the undesirability of any such meeting within the near future,
vetoed the proposal to conduct an all-center conference at any reloca-
tion center. It was stated, however, that, if the evacuees wished to
have a meeting outside a relocation center, WRA would raise no objec-
tion. The evacuees were cautioned against taking any action which
might affect the group adversely.
Interest in a conference had in the meantime been submerged in a
more pressing issue: the announcement of the restoration of Selective
Ser'lice to the Nisei had revived and intensified evacuee interest in
some of the old problems of civil rights and citizenship status. It is
not clear that any large segment of the population had ever been vitally
interested in holding the all-center conference, and those who were
eager to have it were discouraged because of what they called WRAI s
lack of good intentions as evidenced (according to evacuee interpre-
tation) by the Authority's refusal to pay the expenses of the delegates.
D. Selective Service and the Councils
The reinstitution of Selective Service for the Nisei in January
of 1944 precipitated another major crisis at the relocation centers.
The old wounds of evacuation were reopened. Bitterness and resentment
which had lain dormant for several months were expressed in violent
erootional outbursts. Much of the di~ussion represented an honest
effort to secure answers to legitimate questions. Some people used the
incident, however, to stir up opposition, while others used the oppor-
tunity to recount past injustices and seek a redress of grievances.
Petitions addressed to the President, Vice President, Secretary
of war, Secretary of the Interior, the Director of WRA, and other pub-
lic agencies and officials were prepared and transmitted through the
community councils. These petitions represented the reaction of the
more responsible residents following the initial outbursts of emotion,
and were close approximations of majority thinking. These petitions
were also a reflection of the fears of continuing discrimination and ill
treatment. ~ny Nisei felt that the plan of the War Department was in
effect an affirmation of their fears of a second-class citizenship
status; others, particularly parents, were fearful that Nisei troops
I
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,. would be used for suicide missions and that their treatment as casual-
ties and in training would be inadequate and inferior to that provided
other American soldiers. These uncertainties were a normal reaction of
people Who had been subjected to a forced evacuation and who had for
mny months been removed from the main stream of American life. The
anxieties were to be expected of an isolated group Which lived in an
environment of uncertainty. Each petition contained an affirmation of
. loyalty and the desire to accept the obligations of citizenship, but .
included a list of grievances and objectives which were regarded as an
essential restoration of rights and privileges.
If we examQ.ne the events at several centers, we can better
understand some of the factors at work. The community council at
,Granada became the focal point for the conflict which developed at that
center. The issue, as first defined, was one of resistance to Selec-
tive Service unless a full restoration of civil rights and recompense
for losses engendered by evacuation were guaranteed. The more moderate
group favored cooperation with Selective Service but asked for favorable
attention to evacuee grievances. When a vote was taken only four blocks
dissented from the more moderate course. The alien members of the
council who had originally disavowed any direct interest in the problem
allgnOO themselves with the non-ultimattun group.
Following an expression of loyalty, the petition stated, I~
believe, however, that the rights and privileges of citizenship, in all
justice, be combined with the duties and obligations of citisenship."
It then proceeded to list point by point the conditions which the 
signers felt would need to be met before the rights and privileges were
fully restoredo
The petition asked that citizens be eligible for all branches of
the armed services without regard to racial ancestry. Request was made
that all citizens should be allowed to travel wherever they wished in
the United States including the West Coast states, from which they were -
still excluded. It asked for the restoration of 1'\111 civil rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. The request was made for a guaran-
tee of physical safety and provision of ad,equate economic means for
those who resettled. The need for clarification of voting rights was
mentioned and the desirability for extension of eligibility to citizen-
ship to the aliens. It requested fair treatment for those who remained
in the relocation centers and an adequate wage for work perfonned,
based on U. S. Army standards. Request was made that the Government
'WOuld assume the responsibility for enlightening the American public as
to the difference between the enemy Japanese and the law-abiding and
loyal Japanese in the United States. It requested the removal of
restrictions preventing attendance at certain institutions of higher
education. Finally the petition urged that the Government should take
precautionary measures to protect any and all minorities from the
(6,5)
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possibilitY' of future mass e.xclusion and evacuation.
Feelings against certain aspects of the Selective Service programran high at Central Utah. There a citizens' ccxnm1ttee composed of two 
representatives from. each block was established. The community council
established a Selective Service committee which included a representa-
tive of the citizens' committee as one of its members. The citizens'
committee prepared a petition which in its drafting revealed the diver-
gent attitudes found elsewhere.
The petition was transmitted through the community council and
raised a number of questions. It posed the question or the legality of
induction since the citizens affected were in effect incarcerated and .
under supervision of military guards. It asked questions regarding the
basis for the determination to extend Selective Service to the Nisei,
the status of returned veterans, the limitation of service in the armed
services and the reason for a segregated unit. A request was made for
the extension of citizenship rights to aliens, the reopening of the
West Coast, and dependency allotments. It asked for the eliminAtion or
the special procedure for war plant clearance as applied to persons or
Japanese ancestry and for measures to counteract d1scrjmin~tion and to
restore full civil rights.
The petition £ran Minidoka was prepared bY' a citizens' committee
and covered many of the points already mentioned, but inclooed a request
for special military training in colleges and universities, equal oppor-
tunity for advancement, and equality in emplo~ent in industry. This
petition asked also for ravorable consideration of the parents or sol-
diers in the Army and their reclassification to a friendly alien status,
financial restitution for loss, and action against anti-Japanese
discrimination and propaganda.
The situation which developed at Heart Kountain was more dramatic
- and heated than at other centers, and the results were more serious.
There, a small group under the name of the Fair Play Camnittee not only
agitated for restoration of civil rights and protested certain aspects
of the program, but also used the occasion to attack the ;VRA and the
local community council. As a result of tempo~ but widespread
support, the Fair Play Committee was able to develop considerable resis-
tance to Selective Service with the consequence that a fairly large
group of young men refused to report for induction.
The community council, composed at this time entirely of Issei,
had at first mintained a "hands off" attitude toward the whole issue.
As the feeling became more intense and the position of the council came
under criticism of the Fair Play Committee leaders, the council took
the lead in preparing a petition which in its contents was sim!' A1" to
that of other centers. This petition reaff~ed the loyalty of the
signers, -called attention to the hardships of evacuation, asked for
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universal application of the draft 1dthout segregation, induction into
all branches of the armed services, return to the west Coast, full
civil rights, and the same treatment for Nisei soldiers as for other
American soldiers. There was alBO a petition signed by Issei which
simply commended the Nisei petition to the consideration of the Presi-
dent. During the ensuing period of conflict, council members were
forced to define their position and contributed much to maintain sanity
and balanced judgment .on the issues involved.
Although the petitions produced little immediate amelioration for
the mass of the evacuees, they did clarify the situation and gave an
emotional release. As the process of calling young men to the Army
continued, many of the earlier problans w~re satisfactorily solved.
Nisei were made eligible for the special Army training program at
universities and colleges. The long delay between physical examination
and induction of the Nisei was gradually shortened. Letters from boys
actually in the Army must also have had their effect.
Perhaps as important a factor as any was the fundamenta1 coop-
erativeness of the Japanese. The desire to give sane expression ot
Godspeed and good wishes to the departing young men gave an opportunity
for organized center groups to participate. At several centers, the
community council, USO, and parent-soldier groups joined together in
sponsoring farewells.
The most significant change came with the announcement of
casualties from the ranks of those already fighting. At Minidoka, a
chairman of the community council requested the project director for
permission to hold a center-wide memorial service for several young
men who had been ldJ.led. Other centers organized memorial services with
evacuees and staff honoring the parents of deceased soldiers. The war
had changed from "the war" to "our war. 'f
- -
.
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CHAPTER VI
COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZ~TIO~r
-
The emergence of community organization vdthin the framework of
administrative controls was a slow and difficult process. The direct
supervisory controls extended to housing, food, employment, public
relief J la\~ and order, maintenance, fire protection, transportation,
industrial and agricultural production, budgeting and 'finance, property,
health services, education, and others. In only three areas of commu-
nity life was any measurable degree of responsibj.lity extended to the
evacuees. Th~ough a community-o\vned cooperative the distribution of
those goods and services not furnished directly by the Government was
placed in evacuee hands. Through recreational associations, at several
centers, athletic and cultural activities v{ere organized, directed, and
partly financed by the residents. Through community government oppor-
tunity,vas given for political organization and expression. In tracing
the emergence and growth of the latter, some discussion must be devoted
to the civil-service staff to whom was assigned the administrative and
technical responsibility of center management.
A . The "Administration II
,
References to the "administration" have appeared many times in
this record of community government. Of the three major systems of
relationships at each center, that one between the administrators and
the administered Vias the most dynamic and explosive of all. The
history of community government is the history of the attempt to adjust
and systematize the relations between these t\VO segments.
The "appointed personnel II was the terrn used to describe the civil-
service emplovees of the War Relocation Authority and their families.
~ .
This small group of three to four hundred persons at each center pro-
vided a sharp contrast to the several thousand persons of Japanese
descent. This group gradually came to possess many advantages of a
superior variety. It lived in "staff housing," an area of better con-
structed and larger quarters than the "barracks" of the Japanese.
Families lived in apartments vdth facilit~es for housekeeping \vhile
single staff members housed in barracks rooms or dormitories ate at a
staff dining hall. Its civil-service remuneration--even though that
remuneration did not include housing, fond and other perquisites--vlas
many times greater than the $16 or $19 per month. paid the evacuees.
There were separate recreational facilities and most centers had an
"A.P." club. There was a freedom of movement and absence of restriction
not accorded the evacuees. In s~~tion, in every way it was the domi-
nant controlling group occupying a real and symbolic position of superi-
ority and separated from the evacuee community by many barriers.
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Occupying the top position of this group was the project direc-
tor. In him was vested the responsibility tor all phases of center
life and operation. His authority was not always fll1al and his decis-
ions were subject to policies and programs formulated by the national
statf. Except in details, he had little discretion to amend or modify
the orders issued as administrative instructions. He was also subject
to pressures fram his own staft, from the evacuees, and to a lesser
extent from an intangible thing called "the public. If He was frequently
much Jl¥)re sensitive to mintaining good public relations than to the
pressures emanating from the community. The staff pressures were those
inevitably arising in I. situation of this k.ind. They came from conflict
of personalities, interpretation of policies, attitudes, methods of
procedure, and intrastaff politics. Several project directors have
cOIllRented that they were required to spend fully three-quarters of
their time on statf problems.
Any attempt to describe common patterns of administrative atti-
tude and behavior suffers from the danger of over-simplification. The
personalities and e~eriences of the project personnel varied widely.
There were some who had had a long career in Government service. There
were others who had had no previous governmental experience. There were
those who tended to be paternalistic J some were dictatorial and still
others approached problens in a democratic fashion. Some were wen-
trained and efficient, others inefficient and incapable. In spite of
these differences, there were certain simil~rities appearing as recur-
ring constants influencing the behavior of all personnel: the necessity
to conform to the policy and program determined oy the national staff;
the need to maintain cooperative relations within the staff and between
the staff and the community; the ever present threat of public
criticism.
Attitudes of the "administrator" were frequently the controlling
influence in relations with the evacuees and specifically the cOImnUnity
councils. It is the practice of any administrator to utilize the admin- .
istrative hierarchy for the accomplishment of his objectives. Usually,
he secures cooperation by explanation and persuasion, but sometimes it
is necessary to resort to the use of threats and even elimination of
recalcitrant members of the organization. No successful admi_nistrator
can long allow organized opposition within his staff to prevent the
accomplishment of his objectives. That these objectives ~re determined
for the project directors made little difference except in the demand on
his :ingenuity to gain their acceptance with both his staff and-some-
thing new to most administrators-a community.
The administrators, from long habit, extended the administrative
viewpoint to include the conununity council. Protests fran the council
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that its function was to represent and work for the welfare of the
residents were sometimes brushed aside by an administrator who sought
effective methods of reaching his objectives. This philosophy and its
results were all too clearly seen and described by one project director
as follows:
"From all appearances the council seems to be undergoing
that process of disintegration which besets every attempt
to set up a liaison group between the administrator and
the administered. Because of necessity the administration
must rule by fiat, the residents, at first optimistic,
soon recognize the fact that the liaison group has not
power to enforce the residents' interests when these
interests are counter to the administration. The net
result is that the liaison group, afraid of arousing the
residents' overt animosity, becomes progressively more
cautious and, as its reliance upon buck-passing increases,
progressively less effective in furthering administration
policies."
Many of the crises which developed at the centers arose because
of the failure of the project directors to recognize the conflict
between the utilization of the council as an administrative arm and the
fUnction of the council as representative of the residents' interests.
There was, in fact, little appreciation that the interests of the resi-
dents could 1ogically or desirably be different from those of the
administration. In fact, these interests were frequently widely diver-
gent and found expression in conflict between the administration and
the COImnunity council.
Administrators who were in the habit of eliminating opposition
from their staffs by whatever means were needed, were not always able to
use the same techniques to bring the community councils into line be-
cause each proceeded from basically different assumptions. Project
directors viewed opposition as expressions of individual obstructionism
and not as signs of COImnunity disquiet. In one such instance a request
was made to the National Director for permission to remove four indi-
viduals Who were suspected of actiYities inimical to and critical of
the administration. The project director admitted that it was impossi-
ble to develop any concrete evidence as to their subversive activities,
but he maintained that their behavior convinced him that the project
would be better off with their removal. These four individuals included
the chairman and vice chairman of the community council and the other
two were members of its executive committee.
Administrators frequently rationalized their behavior by stating
that no one can bargain with the United States Govenmlent. They assumed
that attempts to secure modifications of policies were in some measure
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a flouting of the authority of the Government and should be suppressed.
Sometimes they took the position that the policies laio. down by \1ashing-
ton were beyond their control and they had no choice except to enforce
them. There were occasions, however, when they transmitted protests
from the community to the attention of i1ashington. A common attitude
on the part of many administrators, when complaints were made to them
was, "if you don't like conditions here you can relocate."
As is true of most administrators, the project directors used a
number of techniques to sec~e compliance with the policies and proce-
dures of the Government. These techniques included persuasion, threats,
coercion, passive inaction, compromises and attempts to split the unity
of the evacuee community by ignoring or bypassing the complaining
groups, especially the council.
Persuasion, through consultation and discussion, was the most
frequently used technique. One example where the interests of the
community were involved brought agreement for reduction in consumption
of gasoline and the use of motor equipment. The order had originally
created considerable resistance from evacuee drivers and stimulated
fears within the community that essential services would be curtailed.
Agreement was reached, however, by working out the problem with the
community council and pointing out the advantages which would accrue,
as well as emphasiz:il1g that no essential activities would suffer. It
was shown to be to the advantage of the evacuees that by careful use,
there would be equipment to supply food to the mess halls, transport
workers, and to provide transportation for events such as funerals and
weddings. It was pointed out that the same rules applied to the
appointed personnel as to the evacuees, and under the existing condi-
tions this was a sensible and desirable procedure. With only minor
protest~ from some of the evacuee drivers, a marked reduction in the
consumption of gasoline was achieved.
Bargaining, accompanied by compromises and concessions, was a
technique used by some project directors. At one project, a shortage
of labor was overcome by an agreement that if the administration rould
pay overtime, the council would recruit sufficient labor to cultivate
and harvest crops. Special privileges, such as food or clothing, were
oftentimes demanded and given in order to recruit workers for distaste-
ful jobs. If these arrangements were made with the community council
it assumed the responsibility for securing labor.
The use of passive resistance or inaction was effective where the
welfare of the residents outweighed the interest of the administration.
Situations arose, for example, where it was impossible to recruit
workers to collect garbage. The administration took the position that
as far as it was concerned it was unimportant whether garbage was or
was not collected. It was quite 'filling to provide trucks and to pay
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workers, but if the cormnunity remained disinterested, then the adminis-
tration was also disinterested. Threats on the part of certain groups
of workers, particularly drivers of coal or food trucks to strike unless
their demands were met were frequently ignored by the administration,
'.." which took the position that this was an operation of direct concern to
the community, and if coal was not delivered or food provided to the
mess halls, then the people would freeze or starve. In such situations
the responsibility for solving the problems rested with the community
and not the administration. There were some reverse situations where
the council attempted to force action from the administration to solve
food and fuel shortages.
The ultimatum technique, accompanied with actual or implied
threats, was another of the devices used by some administrators to get
action or agreement from the council. This technique was used in many
situations and varied from simple 4emands to direct threats.
One of the more dramatic situations illustrating the use of this
technique occurred at Minidoka where the project director created an
issue around completion of the gymnasium and set off a chain of events
which had widespread repercussions. The construction of the gymnasium
had been allowed to drag along because of its low priority in relation 
to staff housing, hog pens and chicken houses. Organized pressures 
from both staff and evacuees began to appear in the summer of 1944.
There was common agreement that early completion of the gymnasium for
community use was desirable and that something should be done. An
abortive attempt was made to arouse interest by the announcement of ajoint staff-evacuee "Build the Gym Week. fI This proved an unhappy.
affair sinc e only a few staff members and no evacuees appeared for the
volunteer work. It was reported that staff members while working made
slighting remarks about the efficiency of evacuee labor and that these
were overheard and caused bad feelings. Too, the staff volunteers
refused to be supervised by the evacuee foreman in charge, with the
result that he walked off the job in a huff.
The project director, in the meantime, had secured an agreement
with Washington that unless community interest to complete the g:jm-
nasium was demonstrated by an adequate nwnber of workers, the gymnasium
would be boarded up. Having secured this agreement, he addressed a
communication to the community council advising it that it was to the
community's interest to finish the construction of the gymnasium; that
it was the COIIU"llunity council's responsibility to provide workers, and
that unless action was imuediate1y forthcoming, the gymnasium would be
left unfinished. This ultimatum, as it was interpreted ~ the. council,
aroused deep resentments and many of its members advocated that the
council resign in protest against the dictatorial attitude of the
project director. The situation was saved by the chairman of the
(72) 
council who hoped to overcome the ill-feeling generated by the adminis-
tration and wanted the gymnasium completed for center use. The council
members addressed a letter to the project director, advising him of
their willingness to cooperate. Their resentment, however, was reflec-
ted in the reply, a portion of mich is quoted below:
jiThe council has gone on record, unanimously, as regret-
ting and resenting the fact that you have chosen to
approach the council on this matter with an 'or else'
ultimatum. We are told that in the meeting of the Man-
power Commission held October 25, 1944, you emphasized
the fact that your memorandum to the council actually
was intentionally an ultinntum seeking to guarantee, 'or
else,' and that you felt tba t you would' just as soon
board up the ~sium right now' as the easiest method
whereby to discharge your administrative responsibilities.
We fail to understand the psychology which prompted you
to adopt such tactics in dealing with the council; surely
you are not so naive as to believe that either the council,
or the evacuee residents as a whole, can best be moved to
action under the brunt of dictatorial ultimatums?
"We might make the coJmnent, incidentally, that majority
opinion among residents clearly indicates a resentment
towards the administration which is blamed for the fact
that this project' S gymnasium is at this late date still
in the process of construction, while gymnasiums at all
other projects (according to popular understanding) were
completed and in use since long ago. The delay here is
being attributed to t he pro j ect administration's lack of
sincerity in the matter of evacuee welfare, as manifested,
specifically in the tardiness with which the construction
was commenced espite having plans, materials, and abun-
dant labor available during the early months of the
project, 131 the substantial reduction of evacuee workers
assigned to gymnasium construction via terminations
ostensibly made necessary by budgetary limitations, and
in the diverting of the reduced number of evacuee workers
fram the gymnasium to the construction of resident hous-
ing for the appointed personnel and for other work.
. "The council will participate in the recruiting of
additional workers for gymnasium construction, via the
, Irrigator,' and via block commissioners who were called
to a joint meeting held specifically for this purpose on
CX:tober 27, 1944, and, in consideration of probable best
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results, Mr. Ishimitsu and his men are to 'spearhead'
the recruiting campaign. In spite of the mnpower short-
age now existing here, therefore, the community council
now feels reasonably certain that the gymnasium vd1l be
completed for service, or in readiness to hold a function,
on December 31, 1944."
The project director's reaction to the council's position as
contained in his weekly report of Oct~ber 2].-28 was as follows:
"The administration's ultimatum 'of course put the council
members squarely on the spot insofar as they were, for a
change, unable to pass the buck either back to the admin-
istration or on to any group of residents. This is not
to say that they did, not try-they tried valiantly-but
they were hedged on one side by a deliberately uncompro-
mising position on the part of the administration and on
the other by the residents' desire for the gym, and--thanks
to the editor of the Irrigator's Japanese section--by the
residents' knowledge that the completion of the gfln
depended upon the council's action. The gym, therefore,
will be completed December 30."
The confidence on the part of the project director that the
gymnasium would be completed by the deadline was premature. Utilizing
the known desire of the community to complete the gymnasium, he insti-
tuted an unannounced system of time checking which recorded the actual
hours worked. When this became known by the workers and was brought to
the attention of the council, which protested the method adopted, he
justified his position on the grounds that he was responsible for
expenditure of Government funds and that this responsibility included
payment for work actually performed ~ Protests of the council that this
system of time checking had never previously been used in any other
activity and was not then being used except in the case of the workers
at the gymnasium failed to influence the project director. Other issues
also intruded including the status of the evacuee foreman who had for
many months carried the burden of construction work and his relation to
the additional Caucasian supervisors placed on the job. The regular
crew walked off the job and new workers could not be recruited.' Negoti-
ations between council, workers, and administration continued, but ,vith
no success.
The council hoped to break the impasse by an appeal to the
National Director. Its communication stressed not only the difficulties
existing between the administration and the workers, but also its
position as a successful mediating body. This last was made explicit in
the paragraph which read:
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"The council was required to accept responsibility for
the construction of the gymnasium, but it was never
consulted thereafter before changes were made, and its
advice calculated to avoid trouble was not accepted.
The prolonged attempt to reconcile the stands of the
administration and the workers has resulted in general
demoralization of those who took part in the arbitration,
and a further reduction of confidence in the council on .
the part of both the administration and the residents.
If this final attempt at settlement of a relatively
minor issue fails, it is clear that the usefulness of
the council in aiding smoother relationship between the
administration and the residents has approached its end.
With a number of difficult problems already in sight,
there seems to be little use for the present members to
stay in office if this matter cannot be solTed."
The reply from Washington was in the form of a teletype
(Message No. 499) dated December 2,1944, signed by the Director and
addressed to the project director at Minidoka:
"Reurtel November 29. Report of community council on
gymnasium construction was not considered to require
any reply from V~shington and involves decisions which
can only be made at project level. The decision on the
construct ion was well outlined in page 3 of Mr 0 utz' s
letter of October 25, 1944, and my phone conversation
of November 27 authorized you to continue in your
attempts to secure full council and community support
in completion of work but no change in official position
Vias possible so far as adhering to deadline established.
In view of work stoppage and delays in negotiation
completion by date set nO~T seems impossible. Please
assure Chairman Fujii for me that we consider council
cooperation of paramount importance and that only desire
of administration is to work out common problems on
basis of conunon understanding and mutual assistance."
WOrk was not resumed and the gymnasium remained unfinished. The
council suffered loss of prestige in the community by its failure. Th~
council chairman was the scapegoat--to such an extent that the community
held a mock funeral for him and erected a cross symbolizing a tombstone
in memory of what the community termed "an administrative stooge and
dog." Needless to say, the chairman was not a candidate for reelection.
Another technique which was used by some project directors was
that of "passing the buck." A common complaint of councils was that
whenever difficult administrative problems affecting the community
(7.5)
arose, the project director would place the responsibility for solution
upon the council. Illustrative of this technique was the attempt of
the project director at one center to make the council responsible for
moving residents from a particular block that had been designated for
school use. After thinking the matter over and discovering that any
action on the part of the council would make it very unpopular ,vith the
residents, the council passed the responsibility for the decision back
. to the administration. There it was laid away quietly, and nothing was
done about evacuating the barracks that were wanted.
A1 though several other techniques were used, reference should be
made to the one of "do nothing." If, for example, the community council
addressed a communication to the project director requesting certain
administrative action, the letter or memorandum was sometimes filed
away 1uthout comment or reply. If, of course, the council pressed for
some decision, then it was necessary to use anyone of several approach-
es to indicate the unwillingness of the administration to take the
desired action.
Project administrators in some cases failed to understand or
accept the fact that community councils Vfere ~sically political bodies,
or that members were sensitive to the demands of the community and
retained. their prestige and status only to the extent that they were
able to convince their constituents that they had won concessions from
the administration. The most successful councils were those led by the
most skilled practitioners of the political arts. These leaders
rewarded and punished, made deals and compromises, used cajolery or
threats, avoided or joined issues, depending upon the wisdom of the
moment. They too, along with the administrators, learned the uses of
coercion, passive resistance, or of persuasion, and used these devices
against administration or community as the need demanded. This behav-
ior won approval or condemnation from administration or community as
it coincided or clashed with their respective objectives.
Councils composed of poli'~ically mature members were much better
able to discharge their functions for the welfare of the residents and
in the interests of snooth administration. The maturity, however, came
only with experience gained from false starts, missteps, crises, and
successes. It was in part a product of increased stability of both
administration and community, producing an environment in which known
factors could be evaluated against current situations, and a course of
action agreed upon. Success in dealing with situations won for the
council confidence fram both the administration and the evacuees. The
confidence was not granted, ho.Tever, upon the basis of successful
political manipulation; it was given in recognition of the council's
promotion of the objectives of either one group or the other.
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rAlthough a number of those Who lived and worked in this scheme
of things attempted to utilize the councils to accomplish their obj~c-
tives, it is not clear that many evacuees or administrators ever really
understood the fundamental political basis of council action. Although
elected by the residents and representative of them, the council had to
be more than a representative body. Encouraged and established by the
administration and listed on the organization charts as a section in the
community management division, it could not be an arm of the adminis-
tration and survive. The councils were subject to pressures from two
sources which were oftentimes opposed in their objectives. Only as the
councils were able to soften, reconcile, compromise, or divert, were
they able to survive. In two instances the opposing pressures were so
great that the councils did not survive, and there w.ere a number of
less dramatic situations where disaster was only narrowly diverted.
B. The "Council"
Community government was an attempt to provide a fomallyorgan-
ized mechanism to maintain systematic relations between the administra-
tion and the evacuee community. As such it was a reflection of and a
contribution to community organization. Through organization, it could
respond to and reflect community sentiments. To the extent that it
succeeded in this double role of organization and reflection of evacuee
sentiments, it fulfilled its function with both the community and the
administration.
Basic to its successful functioning was the understanding and
utilization of the principles of joint participation and responsibility
on the part of administration, councilmen and the evacuee community,
all three. If it can be said that the administration all too frequently
failed to keep the council adequately informed as so consciously or
unconsciously prevented its members from assisting in making decisions
which affected the community, it may be said with equal appropriateness
that the council or individual councilmen often failed to keep the
people informed or to develop interest in meeting new problems. Joint
efforts, to be successful, were as much an imperative of council-commun-
ity relationships as of administration-council relationships.
Essentially the community attitude was that the council should
win concessions for a population that felt aggrieved and often
oppressed. The success of the council t s efforts was measured by the
extent to Which it obtained redress of grievances, negotiated complaints
and won favors from the administration. In this role the council could
not appear to be too cooperative with the administration, nor could it
afford to agree to the imposition of new controls v{hich might prove
repressive. The collncil was expected to maintain toward administrative
action an attitude compounded of latent hostility and eternal vigilance,
and to make occasional strong protests. In contrast, the project
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administration conceived of the council as a group created to explain
policy and procedure in favorable terms to the residents and to assist
the administration in achieving its objectives.
The position of the community council in the social organization
of the relocation center prevented it from meeting completely the
expectations of either the residents or the administration. With the
passage of time, it became representative of the community, a negoti-
ating body to resolve the conflicting interests, and an advisory body
to the administration. It was perhaps inevitable--with the council
obliged to enact this triple role--that there should have been occa-
sional charges by members of the community that the council was coop-
erating too closely with the administration, and, on the other hand,
charges by the administration that the council was obstructionist or
subversive.
There is evidence that this definition of its function was
understood by a number of the more able council members. The address
of the chairman of the council at Central utah at the induction
ceremonies in the summer of 1944, recognized this position as the only
effective basis of council action. In his speech he declared:
"The cormnunity council realizes that the problems of
today and problems to come are and will be much graver
and more serious than those of the past two years. With
this fact in mind, the present council has begun their
serious thinking in terms of the welfare of the residents.
"The council is not and will not work for the self-
interest of any individual or group of -individuals but
for the mutual and general welfare of the all. We will
welcome any suggestions and criticism that are con-
structi ve and helpful at any time, through your council-
men or direct to the office of the council in Block # 1.
'liVe will use every means available to inform the residents
on every subject that is brought to us, the action that
! is being taken, and the progress and the final decision.
I Vie will make every effort to follm~ through on every
, problem and issue so that we may be able to write its finale
to the satisfaction of the residents.
'The present council has decided that in order to perform
its duties for the general welfare of the residents, it
is necessary that we have: (1) solidarity of councilmen;
(2) support and confidence of every resident; (3) support
and confidence of every organized group in the center."
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"To the members of the administration--
"There my be times 'When the residents' request be con-
sidered unreasonable. We want the administration to
appreciate the fact that these requests will be made
only after thorough and careful investigation, study,
and analysis. Only tho se which we believe are reason-
able shall be presented.
"Any request the council determines is out of reason
will not be brought to the administration. We believe
this is the council's responsibility.
"Once we determine it is a reasonable request we wish
the 9.dministration to appreciate this fact and grant us
favorable consideration, otherwise, the council shall be
placed in a most difficult position. Mainly, because of
lack of confidence which will be greater on part of the
residents. In case our request cannot be granted, we
expect the administration to give us justifiable facts
in black and mite.
"I believe there must be a mutual understanding for
better relationship.
"VVith mutual understanding between the residents and the
council, bet\veen the administration and the council, I,
as chairman can assure the administration of the council's
sincere desire to put forth every effort toward the har-
monious and peaceful operation of the center.
"On this basis then, this council hopes to be able to
leave a record to be proud of . . . 'f
Council growth could be measured by an increasingly efficient
organization and effective system of relations between it, the adminis-
stration and the community. At Gila River, there evolved an executive
board composed of the chairmen and three members from the councils at
Butte and Canal camps. This board of eight members met each week with
the project director. At these meet1l1gs, the project director announced
new policies, discussed procedures, and asked and received advice on
questions affecting the community. Opportunity was provided for the
members to present current problems to the project director and thus to
direct his attention to questions which were of immediate concern to
the residents. Council chairmen then reported at a subsequent meeting
of the community council the problems discussed at these executive
sessions. As an example of subjects- covered in these discussions, one
meeting was devoted to evacuee property complaints, Japanese language
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classes, shortage of doctors, segregation problems and program, explan-
ation of food situation during the summer months and replacement of
appointed personnel by evacuees.
The project director spoke favorably of the cooperative attitude
of the council and on one occasion invited the chairman of the Butte 
council to address a staff meeting called to discuss labor problems. 
At this meeting, the council chairman made explicit the responsibility 
of the appointed staff to utilize efficiently evacuee labor. He com-
mented that any breakdown in service or supply was a reflection on the
ability of appointed staff and would reflect adversely in their civil-
service standing. He offered the advice of the council and the man-
power commission in solving labor problems but made it clear that these
evacuee bodies were advisory only and not administrative. He explained
that the interest of the residents was in an efficiently managed center
where goods and services should be adequately and efficiently supplied,
and that it was from this view that the council concerned itself with
this problem. Although his speech carried a threat and a demand to the
appointed personnel to do their job, it coincided with the sentiment s
of the top administrative group which expressed its approval of his
remarks. Although this period ,of well-organized relations with mutual
understanding and agreement on many problems between the administration
and the council was not marked qy any serious crises, there did develop
suspicion of one chairman by the residents. ~~en the time came to elect
a new council, he was not renominated by his block.
In contrast to well-developed relationships at Gila River, the
council at Minidoka in December 1944 was at loggerheads with the
administration. This had come about as a result of controversy sur-
rounding the construction of the gymnasium, the dismissal of the com-
munity activities staff by the project director and other problems.
The situation was sufficiently serious for the council to send a letter
to the Viashington office explaining the situation and asking for assis-
tance. After reviewing the "joint responsibility" function of the coun-
cil and referring to an appropriate paragraph from the community govern-
ment handbook, the letter stated:
"For several months the council has been experiencing
increasing difficulty in maintaining a working relation-
ship with the administration. Underlying this lack of
rapport seems to be some differences in the interpretation
of the function of the community council. In the first
place, very rarely has the council been consulted before
hand on any matter. When the council was consulted, and
it advised the administration a s to the proper method of
approach, it was often considered as being tuncooperative,t
or as shirking its responsibility.
(SO)
I~uring the recent months, the common pattern has been
for the administration to make its plans without con-
sulting the council. The council would then be asked
to help effect a program in which it did not participate
in the planning stage. Criticism of such a program by
the council would often be ignored, or difficulty would
be experienced in withdra~ the program without dis-
rupting the plans of the administration. It should be
noted that the criticism of the council was usually
directed, not at the program itself, but the way in
which it was attempted.
I~ile this state of affairs has not caused any serious
disruption of life within the project, the community
council feels that its duties have been overlooked. The
advice and recommendations of the community council have
been ignored by the administration. The increasing
reaction of the residents is to look upon the council as
the tool of the administration rather than a body which
protects their welfare. On the other hand, members of
the council are not able to present protests against
the administration when they consider it to be in the
wrong without fear of being accused of stirring trouble.
"The community council members feel that steps must be
taken immediately to clarify their position."
The reasoning of the council is better understood if it is
realized that the community attitude was that either the council was
ineffectual and therefore useless, or that it continually gave in to the
administration and failed to represent community interests. n1e
project director was even approached with the proposal that he permit
the council to win some minor point in order to restore resident con-
fidence. This advice went unheeded. Except for minor matters, the
council withdrew from further attempts to seek solutions to problems
through the administration during the remainder of its history.
C. The "Official Functions"
Issued in November 1943, the Handbook for Community Government
outlined these functions for the community council: legislative,
judicial, advisory, communication, planning, and ceremonial. Councils
did discharge these functions to a greater or lesser extent, and in so
doing made significant contribution to the organization and sanctions
of the community.
The legislative and judicial functions which loomed so large
in the early discussions on policy constituted only a minor but
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The council's role in ceremonial activities filled a definite
community need. The numerous memorial services held to honor the Nisei
soldiers who died overseas were ordinarily sponsored by the council in
conjunction with patriotic groups. Induction ceremonies for departing
servicemen were also council-sponsored. The dedication of neYT build-
ings, observance of holidays and other special events, Vlere either
under the direct sponsorship of the council or held with its coopera-
tion. The block councilman always attended each funeral in his block,
and bereaved families frequently sent letters of appreciation to the
council.
D. The Techniques of Action
In actual experience the establishment of the prerogatives of
the community council was a slov1 process. Pressures from the adminis-
tration, the community, or from within the council itself frequently
produced crises, from which there came precedents for future action.
Councils assumed, for ~ple, that they had full freedom to conduct
their own meetings without interference and to hold public meetings
within the center. Only at Granada was this right questioned by the
administration, and there, after a stormy period~ it V1as granted.
The prerogatives of the council in relation to administrative
affairs were much more limited. A situation involving the activities of
the council and administration at Topaz illustrates the process by which
precedents were determined. The council made an investigation of the
hospital and as a result demanded the dismissal of the chief medical
officer. The ensuing discussions between the council and the project
director were concerned not alone with the dismissa.l of the individual
in question, but with the relation of the administration to the council
and their respective responsibilities. The project director granted
that the council had the right to investigate conditions at the hospital
in terms of the relation of the hospital as a public institution to the
welfare and needs of the residents. From such investigations, the coun-
cil could call attention to the existing conditions and make recommen-
dations for improvement of the hospital as a public institution. On the
other hand, the project directo.r insisted hospital management was a
technical and administrative problem, the complete responsibility for
which rested with the administration. This being the case, the demand
for the dismissal of the chief medical officer was out of order and
beyond the legitimate consideration of the community council.
The council chairman and his committee took the position that
their fundamental interest was the welfare of the residents. The
residents had lost confidence in the chief medical officer and held him
responsible for what was considered to be inadequate organization of
health services. They asked for his removal. They were disturbed, too,
that the hospital administrators took refuge behind the plea of
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technical qualifications and responsibilities.
Hospital administrators maintained that the community council,
composed of laymen, was not qualified to judge the adequacy of hospital
services and that such judgment could be made only by qualified tech-
nical supervisors; the problem, since it was both technical and admin-
istrative, was thus beyond the concern of the council. If this con-
tention had been accepted, its effect would have been to deny to the
council the right to investigate conditions on the basis of communitywelfare. The project director appeared as the arbitrator in this con- !
flict of the technical staff versus the political body and took a
position which modified the claims of each.
The role of the community council in community affairs became
defined through similar trial and error procedures. A number of
autonomous or semiautonomous evacuee groups Vlere formed in response to
- certain community needs. Among these yre find community enterprises,
community activities, religious organizations, Boy Scouts, P. T. A.,
and similar associations. These groups Vlere engaged in activities
which affected to greater or lesser extent all the residents of the
center. On the basis of its claim to promote and protect the welfare
of all the residents, the community council at several centers regulated
or entered into the activities of a number of these groups. The council
at Gila River, for example, ruled that the Red Cross membership drive
and collections for the Community Fund should be the only recognized
fund-raising activities within the center. The council at Topaz found
itself in controversy with the Red Cross and raised certain questions
regarding the utilization of funds collected by that organization. At
most centers, the relations bet1veen the council and community' enter-
prises were cordial, but there were two examples of actual or threatened
investigations of community enterprises management by the council which
were justified on the basis of protecting the welfare of the residents.
In the first, the issue was satisfactorily settled by an explanation
from the enterprises, and in the second, the administration ruled that 
the matter was beyond council jurisdiction. 
Regulatory activities of the council sometimes extended to 
individual behavior. There were two centers which adopted resolutions
limiting the amount of money to be given as gifts at funerals, weddings,
or other events. This was impossible of enforcement, but it did serve
the purpose of expressing a community attitude that competitive gift
giving was inappropriate in a relocation center.
The techniques by which the council governed its affairs with the
administration and the community resembled those used by the adminis-
tration in its relations with the council. Councils issued ultimatums,
made demands, bargained, and compromised with the administration as the
occasion pe~tted. It was seldom, however, that the ultimatum or
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demand technique was effective. Councils on occasion employed passive
resistance and sometimes ignored requests or orders emanating from the
administration. For example, one council received an order from the
project director to cease collection of funds for the hospital welfare
association. The chairman of the co\mcil, to whom the order was
addressed, placed the memorandum in his desk and no action was taken.
The collection of funds continued and was ignored by the administration.
In its advisor; capacity, the council used the art of persuasion. It
also "passed the buck" on certain difficult or controversial problems
to the administration.
Councils often found it necessary to seek an expression of con-
fidence or to determine a course of procedure by seeking action from
the residents. In ~portant issues it was the practice for each block
councilman to hold a b1ock meeting at Which discussion frequently
resulted in agreement. At a subsequent meeting of the council, each
member wo\ud report the decision of his block and the action decided
upon. There are, however, a few examples where the council found it-
self in disagreement with b1ock decisions, and as a result held addi-
tional meetings with further explanations in an attempt to secure
community acquiescence to the council's point of viewe
One of the most difficult tasks of the council was to prevent
hasty action on the part of either the community or the administration.
It is obvious that if an issue became joined it would be impossible for
the council to fulfill its function as a negotiating group seeking
suitable compromises. In this role, the council was a buffer, a safety
valve, and a device for the regulation of conflict. It was an institu-
tion through Which the antagonisms and agressions of both the adminis-
tration and the community could be released without doing essential harm
to either. As long as it could control these divergent pressures until
resolution of the differences was achieved, the council's position w~s
assured.
There are many examples of attacks on the council by either me~
bers of the administrative staff or residents of the community. The
attacks from the community \','ere ordinarily taken care of in good tilne
and by methods ~ch the council understood and could use. The attacks
by administrators were more difficult to control. In the examples which
we have, it was only in the event that these attacks simultaneously
threatened the position of the project director that administrative
action was taken. The charge by an assistant project director that the
chairman of the community council was an agitator brought unity to the
community and support for the council but no administrative disciplinary
action. Vfuen the same administrator questioned the position of the pro-
ject director, it was not long until the former's resignation was secured.
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E. Community Participation through Comm1.ll1ity Government
The participation of large numbers of evacuees in the problems
of the community was achieved through community government. The de-
scription of formal organization by which this participation was organ-
ized has been purposefully left until after the analysis of the rela-
tions between the council and the administration and the community was
made.
Almost immediately following the election of the first council
at each center and the selection of council officers, a number of
standing committees drawn from council membership were appointed. These
varied in number from 6 at Minidoka to approrlmately 20 at Gila River.
The organization plan at the latter center duplicated almost exactly
the structure of the administration. The system of numerous standing
committees was found to be 1.ll1workable and was later reduced to the
appointment of chairmen for administration, works, and welfare. As
problems arose in any of these fields, temporary committees were
appointed to investigate the situation and report to the council.
There gradually developed at all centers a number of council-
appointed groups which included noncouncil members. These were created
in response to recurring problems of wide community interest. The
co1.ll1cil at Gila River established 10 permanent bodies including the
judicial commission, juvenile board, juvenile guidance commission,
recreation association, health board, public relations committee, man-
power commission, resettlement advisory committee, food committee,
Butte community fund committee. These groups were distinct from regu-
lar council committees in that their membership was in large part drawn
from noncouncil members. These bodies, under council sponsorship,
worked for the welfare of the residents. 'Some of these commissions
included members of the appointed staff either as full committee members
or as advisers.
The community council at Rohwer followed a slightly different
plan in its organization. Committees were established for agriculture,
education, food, fuel, health, investigations, and welfare, and there
were in addition a judicial commission, a labor relations board, a
resettlement planning commission, and an executive board of the council.
The fuel committee and the board of health included one member from
each blpck, who in most instances were not members of the council. The
other committees included a majority of members who Vlere not councilmen.
The Rohwer and the Gila River plans differed in one major respect: at
Rohwer the committees, commissions, and boards were directly supervised
by the council and made their reports to that body; at Gila the co1.ll1cil
delegated to these groups the right to initiate ac~ion.
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Variations of these systems were found at other centers. The
council at Central Utah created a labor relations board which included
. ,members drawn from the labor committee of the council plus one represen-
tative elected by each of the operating divisions. This total group met
weeklj" and from its discussions, the labor committee presented plans
and recommendations to the council which were then presented to the
administration. There also developed at Central Utah a pattern of
electing one or more members from each block to fo~ conU11ittees con-
cerned with special community problems. There are several examples of
such groups including the committee of Japanese nationals, a committee
of citizens, and a committee for the consideration of problems arising
from center closing. Although these groups originally received their
impet us out side the council, they eventually became a part of council
organization.
Through the exercise of functions derived from the communlty-
approved charters, through a trial and error learning process of the
prerogatives of the council and those of the administration and the
community, and through organization created in response to needs, the
structure of community government remained an emerging and growing seg-
ment of relocation center organization. If there had been sufficient
time, there would have evolved at all centers, as there did at Poston,
two well-organized structures, the administration, and the community,
related to each other through council, block managers, and an evacuee
coordinating hierarchy representing both groups. Even at Poston, how-
ever, there was never created a community structure that was suffi-
ciently strong to resist the enforcement of administrative policies. In
part, this was because the community was itself divided on many issues,
and in part because the survival of the relating structures depended
uEon compromise and adjustment, and the politicians who performed this
function were unwilling to let issues destroy the position from which
they could operate. If there had been established an evacuee orgAn-
ization representing all centers, operating on a national level with I
relations with other American groups, and able to bring and enforce !
pressures upon the national administration of the j~, then the center i
councils might have been able to negotiate to better advantage the
issues arising out of administrative decision. The next chapter is a
discussion of the beginnings of the movement in this direction.
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CHAPTER VII
CO1MJNITY GOVERI'-IMENT AND THE FUTURE OF THE JAPANESE IN AMERICA'
--- - --~--- -
A. The "All-Genter Conference"
On the l1K)rning of February 16, 1945, in Salt lake City, Utah,
30 representatives of 7 relocation centers began a week-long discus-
sion of problems facing the Japanese in America. Three-quarters of
these delegates had been born in Japan. As enemy aliens, they had been
obliged to obtain approval for their attendance at this meeting from
the Department of Justice. Many of the delegates, including several of
the citizens, had not set foot outside the soldier-guarded gates of the
relocation centers since the evacuation in 1942. Some of them had
traveled more than a thousand miles to attend the conference. This was
the first all-center evacuee conference. It came in response to the
crisis precipitated by the announcement on December 17, 1944, of the
reopening of the West Coast and the closing of the relocation centers.
These announcements were not unexpected. For several months
rumors had been current in the centers that reopening of the ~Vest Coast
would closely follow the end of the campaign for the election of a new
President. Those who speculated on this subject realized that further
reduction of center population would inevitably lead to the closing of
additional centers. It was a shock to many, however, to learn that the
WRA intended to liquidate all centers by the end of 1945.
The ~d feelings of jubilation at the restitution of rights
curtailed by evacuation and fears from deep anxieties about personal
and economic insecurity found expression in conversations and meetings
. among most of the center residents. As random discussions became
organized, there developed a widespread disbelief in center closure.
Rumors circulated that the Arizona centers would remain open to receive
those unable to relocate. Among those who had plans or hopes to return
to their former communities on the West Coast, the belief was prevalent
that the Government should and must do much more than was provided for
in the WRA program. The individual problems were myriad, but the mass
problems included personal security, economic status and housing. The
center residents saw these problems primarily as rehabilitation, not
relocation. There was no confidence that the rImA could or would provide
what the evacuees considered minimum essentials of assistance.
These two problems of retention of the centers as war duration
homes for some, and a program of rehabilitation for those who wished to
return, became subjects of discussion by the community councils. Almost
simultaneously, there had arisen at four projects proposals for a
national meeting to discuss these two problems. It was first hoped that
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this conference could be held at some project. The Director in
Washington took the position, however, that if the evacuees wished to
hold an all-center conference, members of the WRA staff would be willing
to attend upon invitation, but that such a meeting must be planned and
financed by the evacuees themselves and must be held outside a relo-
cation center.
With these conditions as the basis for a national meeting, the
Topaz Community Council under the leadership of its chairman, Masaru
Narahara, sent invitations to the community councils of all centers to
attend a meeting in Salt Lake City in February. To this specific
proposal, there vrere mixed reactions. Problems of finance, selection
of delegates, and the wisdom of such a meeting were debated. As it
became evident that most of the centers would send delegates, those
who had been hesitant, with the exception of Manzanar, fell into line
and proceeded with the preconvention task of preparation.
The preconvention period was one of great activity. Community
and council interest in the confe,rence ran high. There were many extra
sessions of the councils to formulate and plan. Committees were
appointed to work out various details. Block meetings were called to
secure resident opinion and to argue the pros and cons of the instruc-
tions to be given the delegates. Surveys \vere conducted. Groups
favoring a flat rejection of cooperation with the WRA struggled within
the council and cormnunity for a follovling. Center-wide elections were
held at Poston and Gila to select representatives. Councils or a
committee appointed from this group determined delegate selections else-
where. Funds to cover expenses were met by assessment and collection
from each block or from colmcil money.
The councils at Rohwer and Heart Mountain conducted center-vdde
surveys to determine the number of people who could or yrolud not
relocate. The council at Topaz through a series of block meetings
secured agreement for a set of resolutions vrhich were to be presented.
Delegates from other centers were given instructions and urged to
formulate resolutions.
Concern over the possible adverse effects emanating from the
decisions reached by the evacuee delegates was expressed by several
project directors in their weekly reports. They were fearful that
agreement for organizing opposition to center closing was inevitable.
They felt that the hopes aroused in their centers for concessions from
WRA were hindering relocation and acceptance of the necessity of center
closing. nlese attitudes were expressed by one individual in his
weekly report as follows:
I~!ost of us here on the staff including me are of the
opinion that the conference idea is very ill-advised and
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will produce far more ha~ than good to the program.
Unfortunately those most interested and those who are
likely to be sent as delegates are the anti-administra-
tion, disaffected, demanding and petitioning Issei type
who VIllI gain no other end but to destroy much of the
good attitude which has been created here and cause
people to be dissatisfied with the present program."
Although the National Director had some concern lest the con-
ference deliberations should be framed as ultimatums or demands, he
maintained that a conference by the evacuees and held outside the
relocation center was a legitimate activity. He accepted the invita-
tion extended to him to attend the conference meetings and expressed
hope that measures leading to constructi~e cooperation and solution of
the problems of the evacuees would be a result of conference discus-
sions. An invitation Vlas also extended to the head of the Community
Government Section in Vlashington to attend as ~~ adviser.
From the all-center conference held in Salt Lake City in Febru-
ary 1945 came the first group expression of the hopes, needs, and
aspirations of the thousands of people of Japanese ancestry who had
been evacuated from the West Coast in 1942. It VIas more than a
declaration by evacuees. It was in effect a definition of the position
of Japanese Americans in America and was intended for consumption by
the center residents, the American public, and the United States
Government. In the eyes of the delegates, it was ~ restrained and
generous offer of cooperation to assist in solving the problems of the
people they represented. It was believed to be a statement of the'
minimum Government assistance needed to achieve just and decent
reintegration of the evacuees into American community life.
.Vhen the delegates arrived at Salt Lake City, they were in a
mood to protest vigorously what they believed to be the coercive
tactics of the lYRA and the niggardliness of the relocation assistance 0
This protest was what the center residents wanted. The delegates knew
that unless they fulfilled the expectations of the electorate that ~hey
would be subject to severe criticism and indignities. The shift from
the desire to strike back for all the wrongs of the past, irrespective
of the consequences, to one of comprehension of the realities of the
situation facing them, was remarkable for its rapidity.
Although there was unanimous agreement regarding the objectives
of the conference, early meetings disclosed serious disagreement on
methods of expression. An analysis of the delegates on the basis of
their attitudes toward relocation, the WRA, and the future, disclosed
three groups, described as follows:
(~)
~1/(1) The Hopefuls: This group was composed largely of
the Nisei and young Issei who had made up their minds
that they Should relocate and soon. They already had
more or less definite plans as to what they should do.
They were convinced that there was a future for them in
this country, and that they had the ability and the
courage to make a Ii vinB for themselves and their
families. This group was also largely the group of
vocal liberals which shaped the thinking and direction
of the conference in a constructive direction.
"(2) The Desperates: This group was composed largely
of late middle-aged Issei. They were men who in their
preevacuation communities were the middle-class respect-
able small business men and farmers. They had insurance
and real estate agencies, or businesses that catered to
a Japanese urban and rural population. Their success
had depended upon a Japanese community. They we~ men
with obligations of family, who felt themselves too
old to start at the bottom of the ladder with physical
labor, and whose small savings were insufficient to
carry them through an uncertain period of reestablish-
ing businesses that would have to depend upon non-
Japanese customers.
I'Thi,s group was basically cooperative. Its memb~rs see 
a home for themselves and their children in this country,
but it feels that there is an obligation on the part of
the Government to provide some special help, or restitu-
tion or guarantee, to help t hem reestablish themselves.
"This group gave assent to the proposals of the liberal
and hopeful group and thus provided the weight of delegate
strength toward a conciliatory and cooperative attitude.
"(3) !he Resentful and Reactionar~: This group includes
two elements--those who are potentially cooperative and
those who are completely negative. Circumstances could
shift most of its members in either one direction or the
other. It Vias composed of both Issei and Nisei. Its
members expressed themselves as bitter at the treatment
of the Japanese in America. They were bitter about their
treatment by the WRA and particularlJ~ about the intention
to close the centers. One member expressed himself as
saying that the WRA treated the evacuees like children.
A Kibei was resentful that he had been on the WRA stop
list, and nOVl excluded by the Army. The reactionaries
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.combined all these feelings plus a probable strong
feeling of Japanese nationalism.
"It was this group \'1hich argued that the proposals of
the conference should be worded as either demands or
ultimatums. It was also the group vlhich in terms of
the entire population was most inward looking in that
the effect of their action on public opinion and the
amount of cooperation from public and private agencies
was a matter with which they were not concerned. It
was the group which would have favored the attendance
of the. Spanish Consul and sought recognition entirely
as Japanese nationals."
The division of the delegates into "liberals," "reactionaries,"
and those "in between" was made by some and coincided closely with the
classification made above. The "liberals" were those who sought to
enlist the support of various public and private agencies for their
cause. They contended that if the facts could be presented to a
sufficiently wide audience that it would be possible to secure greater
assistance in accomplishing relocation. This group. was not in dis-
agreement with the others on the issue of center closing. They felt
that there Viere many "Tho because of age or economic circumstances were
unable to relocate, and the most satisfactory provisions for them coUld
be made in a relocation center.
The "reactionaries" "1ere more concerned vlith-and expected--cen-
ter disapproval of a moderate position. They believed in full resti-
tution previous to agreement to cooperate. They v{ere insensitive to
the possible adverse effect of conference declarations on the American
public, Congress, or the WRA.
Leadership of the conference was won by the liberal group.
Through well planned strategy this leadership was able to secure
approval of the constructive approach. The early emphasis on a strongly
worded protest against center closing was diverted to consideration of
measures to increase relocation assistance. It was contended that the
delegates should be most concerned with the majority of the evacuees
who wished to relocate but could not do so without greater assistance.
The smaller numbers of those who under no circumstances could leave the
center obviously were a responsibility of the WRA. Their problem would
be solved by continued center residence. This leadership also insisted
on the importance of establishing good public relations and the need
to enlist the support of various civic groups. Agreement that formal
invitations should be sent to representatives of such organizations as
Friends of the American Way, JACL, Citizen Committee for Constitutional
Rights, American Civil Liberties Union, Buddhist and Christian churches,
American Friends Service Committee, the Pacific Coast Committee on
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American Principles and Fair Play, Protestant Commission, Maryknoll
Mission, American Red Cross, Y. W. C. A., and to numerous individuals.
interested in the welfare of the evacuees was a gain for the cooperative
element.
The contention that the delegates should not forget that they
were Japanese nationals was met by a telling argument. It was pointed
out that those who were resident in relocation centers had cast their
lot with America. The separation of those who turned toward Japan had
been made with segregation and their removal to Tule Lake. Thus those
remaining in the centers could take no other position than that of
eventually seeking reintegration in American society.
The attendance of the National Director at the sessions on
February 21, provided further assurances to those who advocated a
cooperative approach. The Director reiterated his confidence in the
ability of the evacuees to reestablish themselves and pledged the con-
tinued efforts of the WRA to battle the forces of discrimination. He
explained some of the limitations of funds and policy under Which WRA
operated and promised sincere and honest attention to every recommen-
dation Which they offered. He paid tribute to the many civic groups
which Ylere cooperating and helping to solve the problems created by
evacuation.
The chairman of the conference, in his speech to delegates and
guests at the open meeting Wednesday afternoon, reviewed the history
of evacuation, the losses, the contribution to America and requested
sympathetic understanding for the evacuees to reestablish themselves.
His ~eech ,vas an attempt to describe past relations and future hopes
of the Japanese in America. Some of the significant parts are quoted
below:
"It is now nearly three years ago that 110,,000 persons
of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the West Coast
to relocation centers. . .
'!During the past three years a great many things havehappened to us. We have found that there are many pub- .
lic and private organizations, and many people of good
will who were interested in working toward a just solu-
tion to the difficult problem imposed by evacuation.
"No one is better acquainted "lith the fact that thousands
of our sons are nOVi serving in the armed forces on all
fronts of the world, and that their record is one which
has contin~y called forth praise and recognition from
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military commanders and even from the President of the
United States.
"America is a country of pioneers. We, too, wish to
think of ourselves as pioneers. MOst of us (aliens)
came to this country 30 and 40 years ago. With the
strength of our bodies we helped to build the West's
railroads, to mine the ore and coal, we 'forked in
forests and lumber mills, and we helped tun1 desert
and waste lands into fertile gardens. In terms of the
vastness of America's millions, vre are onl:r a handful,
but we would like to think that we too have contributed
toward the building of this country.
'~Ne knOVf that neither the Government nor any man can
guarantee what the future holds but it is possible for
the Government and its representatives to make a forth-
right statement as to the objectives which it is now
endeavoring to reach. Such objectives should include
in behalf of people of Japanese ancestry equal oppor-
tunities ~th all others for them to v~rk out their
destiny in proportion to their ability."
The significant accomplishments were contained in the "Statement
of Facts" and the 2l recoImnendations. The first was a recital of the
adverse social and economic future facing the evacuees as a result of
evacuation. The recommendations listed requests for increased finan-
cial assistance, greater aids in housing and property, and preventive
. measures against possible terrorism and prejudice. These two documents,
are significant as expressions of the minimum conditions which the
evacuees believed necessary before their relocation could be achieved,
and are included in their entirety.
Statement of Facts
(1) Mental suffering has been caused by the forced mass evacuation.
(2) There has been an almost complete destruction of financial
foundations built during over half a century.
(3) Especially for the duration, the war has created fears of preju-
dices, persecution, etc., also fears of physical violence and
fears of damage to property.
(4) Many Issei (average age is between 60 and 65) \vere depending upon
their sons for assistance and support, but these sons are serving
in the United States armed forces. No\v these Issei are reluctant
to consider relocation.
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(5) Residents feel insecure and apprehensive towards the many changes
and modifications of WRA policies.
(6) The residents have prepared to remain for the duration because
of many statements made by the WRA that relocation centers will
be maintained for the duration of the war.
(7) Many residents were forced to dispose of their personal and real
properties, business and agricultural equipment, etc., at a mere
trifle of their cost; also drew leases for the "duration," hence
have, nothing to return to.
(8) Practically every Buddhist priest is now excluded from the West
Coast. Buddhism has a substantial following, and the members
obviously prefer to remain where the religion centers.
(9) There is an acute shortage of housing, which is obviously a basic
need in resettlement. The residents fear that adequate housing
is not available.
(10) ¥any persons of Japanese ancestry have difficulty in obtaining
insurance coverage on life, against fire, on automobiles, on
property, etc.
Recommendations
We reco1mnend:
(1) That special governmental agencies or uni~s be established solely
for providing assistance to evacuees who might require funds in .
reestablishing t hemsel ves.
. a. Resettlement aid (grants)
b. loans
(2) That the present relocation grant be increased. It should be
given to eve~J relocatee. The penalty clause on the present
form should be deleted.
We further recommend that Federal aid be granted according to
every individual's particular needs until such time as he is .
reestablished.
(3) That long term loans at a low rate of interest be made available,
without. security, to aid the residents in reestablishing them-
selves as near as possible to their former status in private
enterprises, such as business, ,agriculture, fisheries, etc.
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(4) That the WRA use their gpod offices so that consideration may
be given on priority by OPA. Because of evacuation,
residents were forced to dispose of their equipment, trucks,
cars, etc., many of which at present require the approval
of an OPA board. These equipments are essential to many
residents in order to reestablish t hemse1 ves in former
enterprises.
(.5) 'l'hat the WRA make every effort to obtain a return of properties,
for evacuees who, due to evacuation and consequent inability
to maintain instA~nt payments, have lost the same; further,
in order to prevent 108s of property, to obtain some definite
aJ'rangement for the granting of governmental aid, as may be
necessary, to evacuees unable, as a result of evacuation, to
maintain installment payments.
(6) That the WRA give financial aid to residents-with definite plans,
for the purposes of defraying the expenses of im-estigating
specific relocation possibilities.
(7) That the WRA establish adequately staffed offices in important
areas and emploY' persons of Japanese ancestry since they under-
stand Japanese psychology; and also establish in these field
offices, legal advisory and snp1oyment departments.
(8) That the WRAcontinue the operation of evacuee property offices
for the duration, to fulfill the needs of re10catees.
(9) That the WRA accept for reinduction into centers those who
relocate and who find themselves unable to make satisfactory
. adjustments.
(10) That the WRA arrange for the establishing of hostels and other
facilities in various areas; and furthermore, build new housing
through the FHA, with WRA assistance.
(11) That the WRA provide transportation of evacuee property door
to door.
(12) That the WRA negotiate for the establishing of old people's
homes exclusively for persons of Japanese ancestry.
(13) That the WRA make negotiations to arrange (1) so that evacuees
formerly civil-service employees will be reinstated aM (2) so
that persons of Japanese ancestry will be able to secure businesslicenses as formr1y. .
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(14) That short term leave regulations be changed to permit an absence
of two months with one month extension privileges. Also, that
the evacuee investigating relocation possibilities be permitted
to become employed, without change of status.
(15) That when an evacuee relocates or returns to his former business
or home, i~ should make every effort to release frozen assests
(blocked accounts), both in cases of individuals or organizations.
(16) That the iVRA negotiate for the concluding of arrangements where-
under alien parents may be able to operate or manage properties
, with powers of attorney issued by their children, particularly .
by sons in the United States armed forces.
(17) That the VffiA arrange to secure outright releases for parolees
who relocate.
(18) That the lVRA obtain the establishment of some avenue of govern-
mental indemnities for relocatees who may become victims of
anti-Japanese violence in terms of personal injuries or property
damage.
(19) That the \~ arrange for adequate Government compensation against
losses to evacuee property by fire, theft, etc., vffiile in
Government or private storage or while in transit.
(20) That the WRA arrange to provide students of Japanese ancestry
with adequate protection in case of need, and opportunities
equal to those enjoyed by Caucasian students.
(21) That the iVRA make every effort to secure \1ork opportunities
for returnees and relocatees on equal basis with Caucasian
citizens, particularly in reference to admittance. into labor
unions.
B. Post-Conference Activity
In the interim period of six weeks between the return of the
delegates and the receipt of a reply from the National Director, the
temper of center residents changed markedly. The possibility of organ-
ized resistance to the iVRA program seemed to disappear. At Heart
Mountain, the center newspaper made an editorial attack on the dele-
gates and community council. There was an exchange of letters with
eventual editorial recognition of the fact that the council wisely or
unwisely did work for the welfare of the residents. A group of Nisei at
Rohwer, dissatisfied because they had had no representation at the
conference, held a three-day meeting of their own and invited several
outsiders. Council leaders at Granada, in a public meeting, reported
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conference activities and informed the residents that it was to their
advantage to relocate and they should begin making plans immediately.
The chairman of the council at Poston was reported to have stated lithe
war is over,1I meaning that he had shifted his position to one of
approving relocation. The delegates at all centers reported conference
activities at public meetings. There was some disappointment that a
stronger position had not been taken. There was hope that some relax-
ation of policy would be achieved.
The receipt of the National Director's reply was a distinct
disappointment to those 'who had been optimistic. With the exception of
the agreement to employ Japanese-speaking assistants in relocationoffices, the WRA made no concessions. The reply reiterated that
efforts had been made and would continue to be made to solve economic
and social problems. It was pointed out that the problems of those
who were parolees or who had frozen accounts or needed loans, priori-
ties or welfare assistance would have to be met on an individual basis,
and could be met only as the evacuees brought these problems to the
attention of WRA officials. It was emphasized that the WRA was cooper-
ating with various governmental and civic bodies to counteract terror-
ism and prejudice and to facilitate the reintegration of the evacuees
into American life.
The WRA reply did not halt the efforts of councils and the
headquarters organization at Topaz to achieve other objectives. Peti-
tions were prepared and sent to Vlashington, asking for a reconsideration
of the policy which eliminated school activities. Unsuccessful efforts
were made to persuade state and local officials to assume educational
responsibilities. A letter addressed to the Director from the chair-
man of the conference declared that center residents believed that West
Coast WRA officials were inadequately discharging their responsibilities
and requested assistance in arranging meetings between representatives
of ret urning ev~cuees and local officials.
Another general letter was addressed to the National Director
from conference headquarters in June. This letter commented that the
reply to the recommendations made little or no change in lithe original
plan of the WRA relocation program. We see no improvements or
acquiescence to any of our recommendations. II It asked for special
reconsideration of recommendations on loans and grants, the continuation
of property services beyond April 1946, housing aid, payment for door
to door delivery of evacuee property and provisions for personal and
, property security. The letter viewed the closing of schools as a coer-
cive measure against families with children and anticipated deteriora-
tion of food as another repressive measure. The concluding portion
summarized the prevailing tone of the letter with the statement:
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"We are now at the beginning of dissemination and redis-
tribution. As we stated before, we need better .under-
standing and cooperation from the WRA and the U. S.
Government in order to go back to normal livelihood.
Thus far, we see no special attempt made to make th~s
easier for those relocated. Numbers of incidences Lsiij
have been occurring in which relocation has been dis-
couraged even by the use of gun play and fire. No special
policies or provisions have been advocated to right the
wrong committed three years ago. To those of us still
in these centers, such incidences and poor legal justice
meted out do not enhance in any way our attempts to
relocate."
In his reply the National Director was f~ on the point that no
reconsideration of the policy of center closing was possible. He
stressed the fact that great progress had been made in helping the
evacuees to return to a no~l and independent status. It was stated
that it was impossible for the IRA to 'Wipe out the results of evacu-
ation, but that through relocation office assistance with housing,
employment and property, evacuees were reestablishing themselves. It
stated further that, contrary to the belief expressed in the letter,
~ was doing a great deal and was pledged to continue doing so in the
future.
Announcement of the schedule for center liquidation--in June and
July--the steady streaming of people out of the centers, the serious
planning of neighbors to leave in the near future, am the inevitable
disintegration of community life and service began to convince the
"bltter-enders" that center closure was an inevitable reality that must
be laced. Community councils were caught between the insistence of the -
WRA that centers were going to close and the hope of many residents
that some centers would be retailled. By means of relocation coImnittees,
aasisistance was given to those who wished to leave, but the councils
worked at the same time for the welfare of the group which had no plans.
The elections held during June and July of 1945 for the new
council tem indicated that a fair number of residents remained "center-
minded." Officers were chosen and colmDittees were appointed with
apparent d1sreg~d for the fact that within a few months the centers
would be deserted dllages. However, it was only at Topaz (Central
Utah Relocation Center) that the election aroused center-wide interest.
There the issue, aside from being personal and political, was one of
the degree of cooperation with the WRA. The more moderate faction
succeeded in electing its candidate as chairman by a narrow margin.
The chairman in his induction speech reported the need for continuing
centers for those evacuees who were unable to relocate but promised
assistance to those who wanted to relocate.
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By August it was obvious that the days of the councils were
numbered: the minutes of each successive council meeting revealed
additional vacancies caused by relocation of the councilmen. Problems
of center life and relations with the administration were no longer of
much concern to the evacuee community. Families remaining in the
center were too busy planning their future in the outside world. With
. the dwindling community focusing its attention upon life outside the
centers, the councils had no reason for withholding cooperation from
the administration. The councils were at this stage uncompromisingly
committed to furthering relocation, not only for the communities which
they represented but also for themselves.
The last and greatest effort of the evacuees to gain through
community government some greater measure of participation in decisions
affecting their future had come too late. In the attempt, however,
much had been learned by many people.
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APPENDIX
ORGANIZATION OF THE SECTION OF CO1\1MUNITY GOVERmfENT
The War Relocation Authority gave recognition to the n~ed for
technical supervision in the field of community government by estab-
lishing a section in the Community Management Division. This section
was given the title of "Conununity Organization" in the San Francisco
office and "Conununity Government and Activities" in Washington. The
San Francisco office was consolidated with the Washington office in
January 1943 and the name .'/as later changed to "Community Organization
and Activities."
The first person appointed to the position in San Francisco was1~. Vance Rogers, who came to the Vijl~ on a loan basis from the Soil .
Conservation Service. He was followed by Mr. Solon T. Kimball in July
1942. Mr. Kimball had originally been attached to the Colorado River
Relocation Center staff on a loan basis from the Indian Service. With
the reorganization of the San Francisco office in December 1942, he was
transferred to washington as head of the section and remained in that
capacity until August 1945. Dr. Charles Kheier, professor of political
science at the University of Illinois, was employed as a consultant for
the Washington office in July 1943, and remained in that capacity for
approrlmately two months.
The responsibility of the section in vVashington included prepa-
ration and consultation on policy, preparation of manuals and other
materials to aid in the function of community government, and an
advisory and liaison role in Washington and at the centers. Two com-
munity government manuals for the use of staff and evacuees were
issued. The first was largely technical in its content and was issued
in November 1942. It contained suggestive material for the preparation
of the plan of government, the size and organization of the council,
the nominations, elections, conduct of meetings and organization of
committees and commissions. The second manual was issued in November
1943 and was titled 'fA SUTmnation of the Functions, Organization, and
Relationships of the Council and Administration. 'f Both manuals were
issued in sufficiently large numbers to allow wide distribution among
both staff and evacuees.
The manuals proved to be a basic guide in community government
development. They were supplemented by frequent visits to the centers
and consultations vdth both staff and evacuees on community government
problems by the head of the Washington section. Occasional special
visits to the centers were made at the request of the project directors
or the chief of the Community Management Division in Washington.
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.The responsibility for community government was divided among
J three project officials. On the project director rested responsibility
for leadership, liaison between the council and the National Director,
and conducting negotiations on community issues. The assistant project
director in charge of community management held the responsibility for
providing advisory assistance to the councils and maintaining relations
between the councils and the other administrative sections and divi-
sions. The project attorney was responsible for providing technical
advice on legal problems, assisting in the wording of regulations and
resolutions, and giving advice and assistance to the judicial
commission.
The section of community government was listed on the organiza-
tion chart in the community management division. This was the only
recognized section v,hich had no project staff supervisor. It ,~s felt
that the development of community government would be more in accord .
with the needs of the community if allowed to develop in its own way.
It was felt, too, that there should be no intermediary in the adminis-
trative structure between the community council and the project director
or his assistant. The proposal was made in early 1943 that an adminis-
trative assistant to the project director vlith responsibility for
liaison with the community be established. This suggestion, however,
was disapproved.
The advisory and technical guidance given to community govern-
ment varied widely from project to project. The assistant project
. directors in charge of COIIDnunity management at Gila River devoted a
very large share of their time to organization and functioning of the
council and served as the liaison between it and the administrative
staff. In contrast, the comparable person at Colorado River gave
little or no attention to community government responsibilities, all of
which were handled in the beginning by the project attorney. At most
centers, the staff relationship was carried by both the community
management head and the project director, although the evidence of any
advisory function is slight. These relationships were largely those
which had to do with day to day problems.
.1
Under existing policy, the work of the Community Government i
Section would have been facilitated by the addition of one person to
the t~shington section and a qualified liaison representative at each jcenter. The presence of an additional person in Vlashington would have ..
permitted the section head to make more frequent visits to the centers,
and would have made possible the issuance of a monthly summary of
community council activities, which would have been useful to both staff
and evacuees.
Under a policy which gave increased status to community govern-
ment and the development of center organization for consultation with
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the IVashington office on policy, there would have been needed a differ-
ent kind of organization and responsibility. There should have been
established in i1ashington an assistant director responsible for liaison
vdth the evacuees. In a situation of greater permanence, this vlould
have been a desirable step.
#H#
. 
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